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The purpose of this investigation was to test the theoretical possibility of an investor earning a positive 
cash return from the activities of the stock market despite effectively holding no position at all in said 
market. 
 
The sample data were the daily returns for the shares of the 780 companies listed on the NASDAQ and 
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), which fell within the top 500 listed companies by market 
capitalisation between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2017. The reversal strategy’s performance was 
evaluated using portfolios constructed as quantiles of 100 or 500 shares, respectively, where the investor 
had the option of implementing the reversal strategy immediately after an information-gathering period 
closed or a day thereafter. The time intervals used were 1 January 2005 to 29 September 2008 (the day 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average crashed by 777.68 points), 29 September 2008 to 31 December 2017 
and 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2017. 
 
Of the 1000 portfolios tested in each time interval, at least 416 had positive average returns in every 
time interval. Of the portfolios that had positive average returns over the time intervals, at least 66 had 
statistically significant average returns in every time interval. The best-performing portfolio for the 
entire sample period was a combination of the best-performing pre-crash and post-crash portfolios – an 
investor who held that portfolio realised a cumulative return of approximately $61.39 for every $1 
invested. 
 
The conclusion was that it was theoretically possible for an investor to earn a positive cash return from 
the market’s activities despite effectively holding no position at all in the market. Consequently, it was 
concluded that the strong form of Fama’s (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis was disproved. Future 
research should include out-of-sample tests, tests that include restrictions on short selling and tests that 
consider the impact of trading costs on portfolio performance, to render the conclusions of this 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this investigation is to test the long-term profitability of the short-term reversal strategy 
to ascertain whether an investor who had constructed a costless long-short portfolio and implemented a 
reversal strategy could over the long-run have succeeded in accruing statistically significant positive 
cash returns from a synthetic zero position in the market. 
 
To test the long-term profitability of the short-term reversal strategy, analyses will be conducted of the 
performances of 1000 costless portfolios that have been constructed using the top 500 shares by market 
capitalisation listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ over the period from 1 January 
2005 to 31 December 2017, as listed on the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (“the S & P 500”). The 
results obtained therefrom will allow a determination of whether or not it was theoretically possible for 
an investor to derive a positive cash return from the activities of the stock market, while effectively 
holding no position in the market at all, over the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2017. 
 
The word “effectively” is of importance. The investor in question would be holding a synthetic zero 
position in the market, a long-short portfolio composed of equal numbers of long and short positions, 
weighted in such a way that the net value of the portfolio would equal zero. Were the question to do 
with an actual zero position in the market, the answer would be a definitive “no”, for the simple reason 
that said investor would not have any money invested in the market.  
 
But the investor in this case would have money in the market, which would effectively have been 
borrowed. The investor would construct a universe of stocks that was a subsample of the stocks listed 
on the exchanges to which he or she would have access. He or she would enter short positions with 
respect to shares that had relatively outperformed in the sample and would enter long positions with 
respect to shares that had relatively underperformed in the sample. The weightings of the positions 
would be such that the total portfolio value (the sum of the components) would equal zero; the funds 
raised from the weighted short positions would then be exhausted financing the long positions 
completely.  
 
The research question to which this investigation seeks an answer is the following: “Could an investor 
who had constructed a costless long-short portfolio and implemented a reversal strategy have succeeded 
over the long-run in accruing statistically significant positive cash returns from a synthetic zero position 
in the market?” This question is of interest because the convention in investment is to construct a 
portfolio composed entirely of long positions and to weight those long positions in such a way as to 
obtain the desired market exposure (in the manner of an index fund, for example).  
 
The investigation’s purpose becomes of interest because a positive answer to the research question (that 
is, a “Yes” to the question, “Could an investor who had constructed a costless long-short portfolio and 
implemented a reversal strategy have succeeded over the long-run in accruing statistically significant 
positive cash returns from a synthetic zero position in the market?”) not only provides disproof of 
Eugene Fama’s (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis, but also opens the door for exploration of a new 
form of investment, one with lower-than-average risk and higher-than-average returns compared to 
conventional, risk-bearing investment strategies. The Efficient Market Hypothesis, in its strongest form, 
argues that a security’s price reflects all public and private information about it, which implies that no 
investor can consistently outperform the market. The modern portfolio theory introduced by Markowitz 
(1952) holds as a central principle the idea of a risk-return trade-off: an investor will always prefer a 
portfolio that yields a higher expected return, for a given level of risk, but an investor must take on 
some risk in order to receive some returns.  
 
The long-run implementation of the short-run reversal strategy is in a sense a test of modern portfolio 
theory. Modern portfolio theory holds as one of its fundamental principles the idea that it is impossible 
for an investor to generate a positive cash return from a net zero position in the market. If the evidence 
obtained from this investigation yields the answer that it is possible to have a synthetic zero position in 




financial theory because it will indicate that it is indeed possible to generate risk-free profits from 
market participation, in direct opposition to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
 
If it is proven possible for an investor to assemble a long-short portfolio that ultimately costs him or her 
nothing and derive a positive return from what is essentially a net zero position, then Fama’s (1970) 
argument fails because the investor will have succeeded in earning a significant positive cash return 
from the market using a portfolio assembled on the basis of public information available (the use of 
private information ordinarily entails insider trading, which is illegal under many jurisdictions). 
Disproof of the dominant theories will allow practitioners and investors to explore the possibility of 
building practically achievable costless portfolios with which to accomplish the use of the reversal 
strategy over a consistently long period of time, which will allow investors to take on less risk for more 










Chapter 2 contains the literature review, which will be segmented into two parts. Section 2.2 contains 
prior literature, specifically synopses of the conclusions arrived at by financial authorities who 
conducted investigations into various aspects of the reversal strategy’s performance and have come over 
time to be the leading authorities on the subject. Section 2.3 contains arguments based on the literature, 
in support of further development of theory and practice associated with the topics of this investigation. 
 
2.2: Prior Literature (Findings and Argumentation by Leading Authorities) 
 
2.2.1: Jegadeesh (1990) 
 
Jegadeesh (1990) tested for significant serial correlation in stock returns using data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices for the period 1929-1982. 
 
Once said significant serial correlations were identified, data from 1934 to 1987 were used to test for 
and identify highly significant abnormal returns, obtained from portfolios constructed in such a way as 
to presumably take advantage of the predicted returns of stocks.  
 
Possible explanations given included size-based risk adjustments (tests performed failed to yield 
significant results, thus indicating that much of the empirical regularity remained unexplained), time-
varying market risk (it was mentioned here that because the composition of the portfolios varied, the 
betas of the portfolios varied as well and that if one could determine how the betas varied with time, 
one could also determine the predicted abnormal returns; subsequent tests did not yield significant 
results, thus indicating that time-varying market risk failed to explain the empirical regularity) as well 
as bid-ask spreads and thin trading (security prices impart a bias to the expected returns because they 
fluctuate between the bid and ask prices; repetitions of the earlier tests excluding the last trading day 
failed to yield significantly different results). 
 
It was postulated that alternative asset pricing model specifications that allowed for more general 
variation in security risk premia could explain the results that were obtained. It was then concluded that 
there existed strong evidence of predictability in stock returns, thus allowing the reliable rejection of 
the random walk hypothesis. 
 
2.2.2: Lehmann (1990) 
 
Lehmann (1990) studied market efficiency by testing the profits of costless portfolios consisting of 
short positions in stocks that recently outperformed the market and long positions in stocks that recently 
underperformed the market.  
 
Equity securities listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges were used because daily return 
data from 1962 to 1990 were available from the CRSP for those securities. It was determined that the 
portfolio weight for each security would be proportional to the out- or underperformance of the security 
vis-à-vis the equally weighted portfolio of all included securities. A week was held to be sufficiently 
short for the local martingale model1 to apply while the strategy’s horizon was set to twenty-six weeks.  
 
All securities listed on the above exchanges in a given week and in the k weeks beforehand were 
included in the portfolio strategy, with the size of each investment being proportional to each security’s 
return in week k less that of the equally weighted portfolio of all included securities. The investments 
were weighted such that the strategy was costless. A result of the portfolio weights was that the profits 
                                                          
1 A martingale is a stochastic process such that, at any point in time, the conditional expected value of the process, 




yielded were the difference in returns between a long-only portfolio and a short-only portfolio, therefore 
they were measured in percentage points per week. The product of each security’s weight and its return 
k weeks later would yield its portfolio profits for the week. Repetition of the process for all the weeks 
in the investment horizon yielded the strategy’s profits for the entire period. 
 
A major problem that arose with using weekly security returns to detect for market inefficiency as the 
author did was that there were predictable fluctuations in measured security returns that were entirely 
unrelated to market inefficiency in that 80% of the price movements over successive transactions were 
between the bid and ask prices, which led to pronounced negative serial correlation even in daily returns. 
A problem with the CRSP data was that it only listed closing prices, with no regard for bid prices, offer 
prices or bid-offer spreads. The above effects made the one-week strategy look more profitable than it 
really was – for example, stocks that sold at the bid price on a Tuesday would move to the offer price 
on the following Tuesday roughly half of the time, thus yielding an apparent profit on the short position 
in that stock. Some mitigating factors that the author mentioned included considering that the biases 
were only serious problems for portfolios with one-week lags and computing the portfolio weights using 
their four-day returns from Wednesday to Monday, thus reducing the bias by reducing the correlation 
between portfolio weights and subsequent returns’ measurement error. It was noted that said elimination 
of Tuesday’s returns was conservative in that it removed both the “useful” (bid-to-bid) and “corrupted” 
(bid-to-ask or ask-to-bid) returns. 
 
The issue of transaction costs was also raised. The strategy ordinarily required upwards of 2,000 
transactions per week, which would raise transaction costs and, thus, reduce profits from the 
implementation. However, it was unclear which transaction costs were relevant because an investor 
treating the implementation of the strategy as a marginal change to an existing portfolio would be 
expected to face lower transaction costs. Furthermore, the strategy could be modified to reduce the 
frequency of trading.  
 
Statistical tests were then performed to evaluate the profitability of the costless portfolio strategy. It was 
found that the two one-week portfolios earned positive profits for each of the 49 twenty-six-week 
periods, the 98 quarterly observations and the 24 annual observations. The two-week portfolio earned 
positive profits in each of the six-month periods but failed to survive the inclusion of transaction costs. 
There was also little persistence in the return reversal effect. The efficient markets hypothesis ignoring 
market frictions was therefore rejected. The winner and loser portfolios (the short and long positions) 
had weekly average returns within an order of magnitude of their standard deviations, implying that 
they greatly exceeded their corresponding sample variances. The large negative correlations between 
the long and short positions in the loser and winner portfolios caused the resulting costless portfolios to 
have mean profits approximately equal to their standard deviations. Mean profits were positive in each 
six-month period and were more than three times larger than their standard deviations.  
 
In conclusion, the efficient markets hypothesis was rejected. It was claimed that the costless portfolio 
yielded positive returns in approximately 90% of the weeks of the study and, if viewed in six-month 
periods, in each of the 49 periods covered by the data. The measured arbitrage profits thusly obtained 
persist after corrections for mismeasurement of security returns as well as for the factoring in of 
plausible transaction costs. The costless portfolios were constructed using modest positions in 
securities, reducing the likelihood of major market impact and resultant price movements (unless the 
securities involved were illiquid.) The return reversals obtained likely reflected short-term imbalances 
in the liquidity market, which market makers were remedying by serving as intermediaries between 
patient and impatient traders. The “little persistence” in return reversal effects gave rise to two potential 
responses: that one could claim equity markets are on average efficient over longer periods, e.g. a 







2.2.3: Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) constructed 16 strategies, with holding periods of one, two, three or 
four quarters and formation periods of one, two, three or four quarters (the returns of the preceding one, 
two, three or four quarters were used as criteria for stock selection). Stocks for each portfolio were 
divided into deciles; overlapping periods were used, to increase the power of the tests.  
 
Using daily returns data drawn from the Center for Research in Security Prices for the years 1965 to 
1989, the reversal strategies were then tested. The costless portfolios all yielded positive returns, each 
of which (except for the three-month/three-month strategy, which did not skip a week) were statistically 
significant; the most successful strategy was the 12-month/three-month strategy, which yielded 1.31% 
per month.  
 
Emphasis was then placed on the six-month/six-month strategy and an attempt was made to identify the 
sources of the profits. A one-factor model was constructed, then portfolio betas, 6-month serial 
covariance and lead-lag effects were tested. It was found that the betas of extreme past returns exceeded 
the betas of the full sample. It was also found that, because the betas of past winners were higher than 
those of past losers, the costless portfolios had negative betas. It was inferred from the evidence that 
market risk did not explain the profits. Tests of 6-month serial covariance determined that it was 
negative, thus eliminating it as a possible cause.  
 
Evidence was found that suggested stock underreactions to firm-specific information were causing the 
profits, but said evidence was also consistent with an alternative model featuring lead-lag effects of 
factors on stocks. But tests that were conducted yielded evidence that the postulated lead-lag effects 
were not important sources of relative strength profits.  
 
Subsequently, profitability was tested based on size and beta by using three size-oriented and three beta-
based subsamples. The subsample with the largest firms yielded lower results than the other size-based 
subsamples. Evidence implied that cross-sectional differences in systematic risk within the sample did 
not explain performance and that profits were due to serial correlation in firm-specific returns. Evidence 
also suggested that the profits observed were due to buy-side performance (the long positions) rather 
than sell-side performance (the short positions).  
 
Tests conducted in different sub-periods found that reversal strategies generally underperformed in 
January and were low in August, but outperformed in April, November and December, thus exhibiting 
a sort of seasonality. When assessing portfolio performance in event time, the cumulative returns 
exhibited an inverted U shape, which authors had initially been thought to be due to a high initial risk 
followed by a decline in risk, but risk increased over that period. It was found that earnings 
announcements caused momentum, with winner portfolios significantly outperforming loser portfolios 
(by at least 0.7% on average) for the first six months after an earnings announcement, then 
underperforming eight to 12 months later.  
 
It was concluded that costless winner-minus-loser portfolios realised significant abnormal returns over 
their sample period and that the reversals observed in the sample data indicated that a more sophisticated 
model of investor behaviour was needed.  
 
2.2.4: Mei and Gao (1995) 
 
Mei and Gao (1995) studied return reversals in 132 real estate securities traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Daily returns for those securities were 
extracted using the CRSP tape from 2 July 1962 to 31 December 1990. Lehmann’s (1990) methodology 
was applied to their analysis. Return reversals observed were first documented. Thereafter, an arbitrage 





It was found that the arbitrage portfolio’s profits significantly exceeded zero for all period lengths and 
time horizons, but the degree of profitability differed between cases. If a six-month or one-year trading 
period were used to evaluate the portfolio, the trading week yielded the best results (semi-annual returns 
of 30.77 cents and annual returns of 62.2 cents on a costless portfolio with $1 in each long and short 
position) – this result was in keeping with Lehmann’s (1990) original result (using a calendar week) 
and implied that it takes approximately a week for the market to realise return reversals, a finding 
consistent with French and Roll’s variance ratio test result, which stated that stocks had strong negative 
autocorrelations for time horizons beyond one week.   
 
To test the consistency of the strategy, separate sub-analyses of their data were conducted for the 1960s, 
‘70s and ‘80s. While all semi-annual and annual returns were positive for all three decades, returns 
declined as time progressed. The decline was attributed to active arbitraging in the market during the 
1980s.  
 
It was found that the shorter the lag time, the better the results of the portfolio were. For lags larger than 
four trading weeks, portfolios constructed using that data yielded negative results, a finding similar to 
Lehmann’s result (1990) that a portfolio wherein the weights were based on information about the most 
recent period’s returns was the most profitable. Results indicated that the return reversal effect was most 
prominent at weekly intervals. 
 
The arbitrage portfolio ordinarily yielded statistically significant abnormal profits exceeding what 
would otherwise be obtained but said abnormal profits disappeared once transaction costs were 
considered and, in fact, the arbitrage portfolio yielded returns significantly lower than the non-arbitrage 
portfolio.  
 
It was concluded that although there existed some statistically significant return reversals in exchange 
traded real estate securities, which could lead to economically significant trading profits if trading costs 
could be somehow avoided, the consideration of the implicit bid-ask spread and the deduction of the 
trading costs effectively eliminated the trading profits, proving the efficiency of the real estate market 
in that one could not profit from return reversal arbitrage. It was also recommended that long-term real 
estate security managers reduce their acquisition costs by purchasing a few days after a weekly rally 
and selling a few days after a weekly downturn – the caveat attached was that, while that rule would 
not guarantee investment savings or gains in each transaction, it ought in the long run to increase 
portfolio performance.   
 
2.2.5: Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
 
Keim and Madhavan (1997) examined the magnitude and determinants of transaction costs for a 
sample of institutional traders with different investment styles.  
 
It was first noted that investment performance reflected a portfolio manager’s investment strategy and 
the trading costs associated therewith. The components of the investment strategy included the selection 
of shares to be traded and the timing of the trades. It was also noted that trading costs were able to 
markedly reduce the notional return to an investment strategy. From those observations came the 
argument that there was great interest in assessing the magnitude of trading costs. A corollary to the 
argument was the fact that, because trading costs could vary substantially across trading styles, any 
analyses to be conducted had to be in relation to the investment strategy used.  
 
It was noted that differences in investment style caused substantially different demands for immediacy 
of trade and it was speculated that resulting differences in order submission strategies probably caused 
differences in trading costs. It was also speculated that the magnitude of trading costs could be 
influenced by the market on which a stock traded. It was noted, though, that while small retail traders 
were price takers, large institutional traders typically negotiated prices directly with dealers. Thus, the 
institutional traders possibly avoided the collusion among dealers that served to widen quoted bid-ask 




questions regarding the relative merits of alternative trading designs, particularly regarding the 
mechanisms that different markets use to conduct trades (auction mechanisms, such as were used in the 
exchanges, or dealer markets, such as was then used by NASDAQ). It was put forward that trading 
costs had two major components: explicit costs (largely commission costs) and implicit costs (primarily 
the price impact of a trade). It was also put forward that examination of both components jointly was 
of great importance because of the possibility that they were systematically related. 
The data used for the analysis were data on then recent equity transactions by 21 institutional traders, 
which amounted to $83 billion. The data covered more than 62,000 equity orders, each of which 
typically resulted in multiple trades, placed by institutions that differed in their investment objectives 
and trading styles. Focus was placed on institutional investors because they accounted for a significant 
proportion of equity ownership and trading volume. The data were deemed unique in that they provided 
a complete record of all individual trades generated by a specific indicated desire to trade, which was 
important because an order for a certain number of shares might have resulted in several distinct trades 
spanning many different and not necessarily adjacent days. The data allowed for the measurement of 
the total costs associated with a particular strategy involving multiple trades as opposed to the costs of 
an individual trade. The data also included information about whether the initiated trade was a purchase 
or sale. In particular, the institutions in the sample indicated, at a particular date, a specific desire to 
initiate a programme to purchase or sell stated quantities of shares of a stock to adjust their portfolio 
composition. A trader who approached the market intending to purchase shares would receive a 
different response compared to one who sought to sell shares, so it was an important distinction to be 
made. Most trades in the sample, both unweighted and weighted by the value of the trade, were executed 
using market orders, so the classification was held to closely resemble one based on whether immediacy 
was demanded or supplied.  
 
The findings of the investigation were the following. Transaction costs were substantial. Both explicit 
and implicit trading costs were positively related to measures of trade difficulty. Trades in NASDAQ 
stocks were generally more expensive than comparable trades in equity-listed stocks, particularly for 
buyer-initiated shares. Purchases were generally more costly than equivalent sales, especially in small 
stocks. Substantial variation in trading costs across institutions was documented – said variation 
reflected differences in investment style and trade difficulty. However, even within a particular 
investment style, there were considerable differences in the costs faced by various institutions, which it 
was speculated possibly arose from differences in trading skill. Some institutions in the sample had 
significant positive excess costs that could not be explained by their order characteristics or the stocks 
that they traded.  
 
2.2.6: Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) reviewed the then-existing literature regarding momentum and 
momentum strategies. Jegadeesh’s (1990) and Lehmann’s (1990) original finding that losers over the 
preceding one week to one month outperformed winners over the following one week to one month was 
cited, as was Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) work, specifically the findings of seasonality in portfolio 
performance and the finding that when strategies skipped a week between the formation period and the 
holding period, they generated higher and more significant returns.  
 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) was also covered. Chui, Titman and Wei had investigated the profitability 
of momentum strategies in international markets. It was found that different cultures exhibited 
momentum differently, with more individualistic cultures weighted more highly information that they 
came by on their own as opposed to more collectivist cultures, wherein the opposite happened. It was 
also found that momentum strategies were less popular in more collectivist cultures.  
 
2.2.7: De Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012) 
 
De Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012) investigated the impact of trading costs on short-term reversal 
investment strategies. Following reference to earlier work on the topic by various authors, it was argued 




small-cap stocks. When stocks were ranked according to past returns, the most volatile stocks were 
most likely to be in the extreme quantiles and they were typically the stocks with the smallest market 
capitalisations. Consequently, a long-short portfolio using stocks in the extreme quantiles would contain 
them, which would raise trading costs because those stocks were generally the costliest to trade and the 
raised trading costs could eliminate reversal profits. Three hypotheses were tested: that the reported 
impact of trading costs on reversal profits was largely attributable to excessive trading in small-cap 
stocks and reducing the universe to large-cap stocks would significantly reduce costs; that trading costs 
could be further reduced by implementing a more sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm; and 
that trading costs affected European markets more strongly because of lower liquidity. 
 
The American stock data comprised the 1,500 largest stocks in the Citigroup US Broad Market Index 
(BMI) from January 1990 to December 2009, without micro-cap stocks to ensure their findings were 
free of market microstructure concerns. The European stock data comprised return data for the largest 
1000 stocks in the Citigroup European Broad Market Index from January 1995 to December 2009 – the 
trading cost model that was used, provided by Nomura Securities, was not accurately calibrated to 
estimate trading costs for European stocks before 1995. The FactSet Global Prices database provided 
daily stock returns (including dividends), market capitalisation and price volumes. 
 
Nomura’s researchers provided aggregated data in the form of average trading costs for decile portfolios 
of S&P 1500 stocks sorted by quarterly dollar volume from January 1990 to December 2009. That 
allowed trading cost estimates for a specific stock’s trading cost estimate using the stock’s volume rank 
at a point in time. Other assumptions were that trades closed within 24 hours and that trade sizes were 
$1,000,000 by the end of 2009. Trade sizes were deflated by 10% per annum. It was argued that the 
assumption about the sizes ensured that any effects they documented could be exploited by a sizeable 
strategy.  
 
The same trade sizes were used in the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model to estimate trading costs as 
in the Nomura model. For the sample, it was found that the cost estimates closely matched Keim and 
Madhavan’s (1997). It was found that the most liquid stocks with the largest trading volumes had 
negative cost estimates and the number of stocks with negative estimates increased over time. Keim 
and Madhavan’s (1997) model yielded negative cost estimates for nearly half the stocks in the 2007 
sample. Nomura’s cost estimates for S&P1500 stocks were up to six times larger than Keim and 
Madhavan’s (1997). 
 
The differences in cost estimates provided by the models became more extreme once considerations 
were restricted to the 500 largest stocks in the sample. Keim and Madhavan’s (1997) were very low 
and, in many cases, even negative, with many years in the sample period featuring entirely negative 
estimates. Nomura’s estimates were substantially higher. Keim and Madhavan’s (1997) model gave 
average one-way trading costs of 0.04% for the top 50 stocks; Nomura’s model gave average one-way 
trading costs of 0.06% for the bottom 50. Some reasons for the differences in cost estimates were 
postulated. Nomura’s model imposed a quadratic relationship on trading volume and transaction costs, 
which made cost estimates positive even for the most liquid stocks; Keim and Madhavan’s (1997) model 
imposed a logarithmic relationship, which made cost estimates for some of the most liquid stocks to be 
negative. Keim and Madhavan’s model used a constant negative coefficient for market capitalisation, 
but the average market capitalisation of the sample increased over time, so the cost estimates declined. 
It was admitted that scaling techniques had not been applied to prior trading costs – if previous trading 
costs had been inflated, as was done in the literature, larger cost reductions would have been observed. 
Nomura’s model was periodically recalibrated and so was able to adjust to changing market conditions 
within the sample.  
 
The Keim and Madhavan (1997) trading cost model was used to estimate net reversal profits for the 
first analysis. Keim and Madhavan [1997] modelled trading costs using the following equation: 𝐶𝑖 =
 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖





𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝜖𝑖, where for 




stock traded was listed on NASDAQ and zero otherwise, Trsizei was the ratio of the order value to the 
traded stock’s market capitalisation, Pi was the price of the traded stock, DiTECH was a dummy variable 
for technical managers, DiINDEX was a dummy variable for index managers and ϵi was the error term.  
 
A problem that was noted with the model was that its coefficients were estimated over the period 
January 1991 to March 1993 – it was wondered if the estimates obtained were more accurate over recent 
periods, given the changes in the markets since that period. It was also noted that increased trading 
volumes over time, increased competition among stockbrokers and technological advancements might 
have had significant impacts upon bid-ask spreads, market impact costs and commissions. To mitigate 
against the potential adverse effects of their observations, trading cost estimates for stocks that were 
within the S&P 1500 index over the sample period were obtained from Nomura. Nomura’s trading cost 
model was calibrated quarterly from 1995 to 2009. The estimated broker commissions were 0.05% per 
trade in the 1990s and 0.03% in the early 2000s.   
 
The belief was expressed that, due to the observations above, the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model’s 
trading cost estimates were to be cautiously interpreted. It was acknowledged that said model was 
probably optimally specified for its initial purpose (describing in-sample relations between trading costs 
and stock characteristics). It was deemed desirable that Nomura’s model had been calibrated using 
European trade data from 1995 to 2009, which allowed investigations of reversal profits and trading 
costs within those markets.  
 
It was stated that, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, their research was the first to investigate trading 
cost impact on reversal profits in European equity markets and give a comprehensive overview of 
trading costs impact on said profits. It was expected that European trading costs would exceed US costs 
due to the European markets’ comparative illiquidity. Comparisons of the trading cost estimates for the 
1500 largest US stocks with those of the 1000 largest European stocks, all provided by Nomura, yielded 
results that matched expectations. 
 
Reversal profits were first analysed across different market cap segments. Reversal profits were 
evaluated for the 1500, 500 and 100 largest US stocks. It was hypothesised that the reported impact of 
trading costs on reversal profits was mostly due to excessive trading in small-cap stocks and that 
restricting the stock universe to large-cap stocks would significantly reduce trading costs. Portfolios 
were constructed by daily sorting all available stocks into mutually exclusive quintile portfolios based 
on the preceding five trading days’ results, assigning equal weights to each stock. The portfolios held 
long positions in the 20% of stocks in each portfolio with lowest returns and short positions in the 20% 
of stocks with highest returns, based on the previous week’s performance. A day was skipped between 
ranking and construction to avoid bid-ask bounces. Portfolios were rebalanced daily. Gross and net 
returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio and the long-short portfolio less the equally-weighted 
quintile portfolio return were calculated. Net returns for each stock at each point in time using the 
trading cost estimates mentioned earlier were also calculated, with the “conservative” restriction that 
all estimates were non-negative.  
 
The strategy was first considered using the 1500 stocks. A reversal strategy such as the one outlined in 
the last paragraph yielded gross returns of 0.617% per week and a weekly turnover of 677%, with an 
average holding period of fewer than three days. However, trading costs (using Nomura’s as well as 
Keim and Madhavan’s [1997] estimates) eliminated returns entirely, leading to net losses of -1.037% 
and -0.661%, respectively.  
 
There was a highly nonlinear relationship between market capitalisation or trading volume and trading 
costs such that the smallest and least liquid stocks were the most expensive to trade – disproportionately 
so, especially because their higher volatility gave them the highest probability of falling within the 
extreme quintiles when stocks were ranked on past returns, thus implying that long-short portfolios 
were typically invested in the most expensive stocks. It was noted that while some studies reported 
stronger anomalies among small-cap stocks, there was room to wonder if the potentially higher returns 





The reversal strategies for the largest 500 and 100 stocks outperformed the strategy for the largest 1500 
stocks, both in terms of gross return and in terms of cost-adjusted net returns under the Nomura and 
Keim and Madhavan (1997) models. The results indicated that reversal profits appeared to be highest 
among the largest stocks. The results also demonstrated that small-cap stocks’ higher trading costs 
outweighed their potentially higher returns. It was written that the finding that investors could use 
reversal strategies to earn themselves significant net weekly returns upwards of 0.3% was a serious 
challenge to rational asset pricing models and had important implications for reversal strategies’ 
practical implementation. It was concluded that the key lesson was that investors seeking to earn 
superior returns through reversal trading were more likely to realise their objectives by trading in liquid 
stocks with low transaction costs.  
 
The conventional reversal portfolio construction method was cited as a reason for the importance of 
trading costs. It was written that the conventional method was sub-optimal when evaluating a real-live 
investment strategy and considering trading costs, as it would only benefit the holder if trading costs 
were less than the expected return differential. It was argued that a portfolio construction method that 
directly sold stocks that were no longer relative losers and bought back stocks that were no longer 
relative winners, would cause excessive transaction costs and generate excessive turnover. Lowering 
the rebalancing frequency exposed one to the risk of holding stocks that had already reverted. In 
response, it was suggested that the portfolio be rebalanced stock by stock when a stock was at least 
among the top 50% of winning or losing stocks based on past return, at which point said stock would 
be replaced by the stock with the lowest or highest past-week return at that time, which had not yet been 
included in the portfolio. It was argued that this “smart” approach would have a substantially lower 
turnover than the “standard” approach and would have the same number of stocks, just with flexible 
holding periods.  
 
The reversal strategy was re-tested using the same stocks, but with the modified approach. With the 
1500-stock reversal strategy, weekly turnover reduced from 677% to 325%, with an effective holding 
period per stock of approximately six days. Keim and Madhavan’s (1997) trading cost estimate was 
0.61%; Nomura’s was 0.28%. For the 500-stock and 100-stock reversal strategies, weekly turnovers 
were 326% and 337%, respectively. While gross returns were marginally lower than under the 
“standard” model, the “smart” model yielded higher net returns for all strategies using both cost models. 
All net returns proved to be highly significant statistically and economically. 
 
Reversal profits in European markets were then evaluated. Quintile portfolios were then constructed for 
the 1000, 600 and 100 largest European stocks to calculate long-short reversal portfolio returns. Only 
the Nomura estimates were used; both the conventional and modified methods were applied. The 
European results displayed the same characteristics as the US results: the modified method yielded 
better results across all portfolios; the fewer the stocks in the portfolio, the better the strategy performed; 
the conventional method yielded net losses, but the modified method yielded net profits. Trading costs 
did, however, have a larger impact in Europe than in the US, because Europe’s stock market was less 
liquid than the US’s.  
 
Follow-up analyses were then performed. At first, the conventional model was applied but with 
rebalancing every five days. Applied to the US stocks as mentioned above, weekly turnover decreased 
to 306%, 310% and 315% for the top 1500, 500 and 100 US stocks, respectively. The decrease in weekly 
turnover did decrease trading costs, but gross returns also declined. While the 500-stock and 100-stock 
reversal strategies yielded net returns, the 1500-stock strategy yielded a net loss due to a 0.205% decline 
in gross returns due to the change in rebalancing frequency. The order of magnitude of the net reversal 
profits did not change.  
 
Two subperiod analyses were then performed. The first pertained to the period January 2000 to 
December 2009; the second to the period January 2002 to December 2007 (after the dotcom bubble 
burst and before the subprime bubble burst). The conjecture for the first analysis was that the 




profits, and that – in keeping with Low’s (2004) Adaptive Market Hypothesis that the public 
dissemination of an anomaly might affect its probability – increased investment activities by 
professional investors after publications about the reversal effect in the late 1990s had arbitraged away 
much of reversal strategies’ anomalous profits.  
 
For the first analysis, the “smart” strategy’s net profitability was largely constant, with net returns 
ranging from -0.279% (1500 stocks) to 0.59% (100 stocks). For the second analysis, net profits ranged 
from -0.178% (1500 stocks) to 0.348% (100 stocks). There were concerns that the cost estimates 
underestimated in-crisis costs and overstated reversal profits. It was concluded that reversal profits were 
constant over time and rather profitable during non-crisis periods. 
 
The findings were then tested for robustness to the choice of trade rule. They evaluated reversal profits 
for the 500 largest US stocks that sold stocks once their rank in past-week return exceeded the 30th, 40th, 
60th, 70th and 80th percentiles, with purchases taking place at the corresponding opposite percentiles. 
The best results were achieved under the 70/30 rule (0.353% weekly net returns.) Reversal profits were 
highly significant statistically and economically for all trade rules. It was concluded that their findings 
were robust with respect to trade rules. 
 
Gross and net returns of the “smart” long-short reversal portfolios for the largest 1500, 500 and 100 US 
stocks were regressed on the Fama-French risk factors for market, size and value. In all cases, the Fama-
French risk factors had very little explanatory power, with the highest adjusted-R2 observed having 
been 5%. It was concluded that reversal profits were unrelated to common risk factor exposures. 
 
It was argued that the findings had critical implications for explanations in the literature of reversal 
anomalies. Short-term reversals were generally held to be evidence of a shortage of sufficient market 
liquidity to offset price effects arising from unexpected purchase and sale pressures and that market 
makers set their prices partly to control their inventories. In following the liquidity explanation, 
reversals should have diminished over time as market liquidity increased. Also, reversal effects should 
have been stronger for small-cap stocks, which had higher turnovers, than for large-cap stocks, that had 
generally lower turnovers. However, their findings refuted the liquidity explanation. Lo and Mackinlay 
(1990) as well as Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) noted that nonsynchronous trading 
contributed to contrarian profits. Their explanation assumed the gradual diffusion of information in 
financial markets and that large-cap stocks reacted faster to information than small-cap stocks because 
they had greater analyst coverage. The findings, however, refuted that explanation as well. Only the 
behavioural explanation suggested in the literature, that market prices tend to overreact to information 
in the short run, was not refuted by the findings. 
 
It was ultimately concluded that the earlier finding that trading costs rendered reversal strategies 
unprofitable was largely due to excessive trading in small-cap stocks. A more sophisticated portfolio 
construction method and restriction of the stock universe to large-cap stocks would reduce trading costs 
significantly and generally result in statistically and economically significant net returns. 
 
2.2.8: Booth, Fung and Leung (2016) 
 
Booth, Fung and Leung (2016) investigated the nature of the momentum reversals exhibited by 
American stock returns from 1962 to 2013. It was first contended that momentum-reversal as a 
phenomenon could be explained using the traditional risk-return paradigm. It was argued that the earlier 
supposition was supported by the notion that large institutional traders preferred to take large positions 
in large-company stocks because small-company stocks often suffered from such things as short-selling 
restrictions, a lack of market depth and information asymmetries.  
 
The data used were stock price, return, institutional trading and volume data from the AMEX, 
NASDAQ, NYSE and NYSE Arca from January 1962 to December 2013. The institutional trading data 
were obtained from Thomson Reuter, Institutional Trading (13F); the other data were obtained from the 




the data sample were retrieved. For each quarter after 1980, data concerning institutional investors’ 
holdings, shares outstanding at the end of each quarter and institutional trading volumes. A double-sort 
procedure was implemented, sorting into quintiles first by returns, then by market capitalisation. The 
procedure was also conducted in reverse, to test for the impact of the sorting order on the results.  
 
The quintile with the largest stocks became the “big” quintile and the one with the smallest became the 
“small” quintile. The stock with the highest returns in each quintile became the “winner”; the one with 
the lowest became the “loser”. The authors created six long-short portfolios:  
 
1. a long position in the losing big portfolio with a short position in the losing small portfolio;  
2. a long position in the winning big portfolio with a short position in the winning small portfolio; 
3. a long position in the winning small portfolio with a short position in the losing small portfolio; 
4. a long position in the winning big portfolio with a short position in the losing small portfolio; 
5. a long position in the winning small portfolio with a short position in the losing big portfolio; 
6. and a long position in the winning big portfolio with a short position in the losing big portfolio. 
 
The continuously compounded cumulative mean returns of the loser/big-loser/small strategy were all 
negative and statistically significant for all the holding periods following portfolio formation, 
suggesting that shorting the smallest firms would incur short- and long-term losses. The market 
capitalisations of the long portfolios economically and statistically exceeded those of the short 
portfolios, which implied that there was a small-firm effect that dominated the momentum effect. 
Institutional investors were found to largely invest in large firms and not necessarily trade in accordance 
with recent momentum. The performance results of the winner/big-winner/small portfolio demonstrated 
that there was a small-firm effect at work and the short portfolio’s returns dominated those of the long 
portfolio. But over various holding periods, the winner/big-winner/small strategy yielded statistically 
significant negative cumulative returns. 
 
The winner/small-loser/small strategy also exhibited evidence of the small-firm effect dominating the 
momentum effect (the long portfolio’s market capitalisation exceeded the short portfolio’s), implying 
there were significant positive returns to be yielded by the reverse strategy.  
 
The winner/big-loser/small strategy yielded significant negative returns for all periods. The results were 
consistent and significant in the short- and long-term, implying there were significant positive returns 
to be yielded by the reverse strategy. 
 
The winner/small-loser/big portfolio had a significantly larger short portfolio than long portfolio. All 
cumulative returns were positive and significant, due to the combined positive effects of momentum 
and size benefiting performance. Institutional investors appeared to invest significantly more in the long 
position than in the short position.  
 
The winner/big-loser/big strategy was free of any small-firm effects. Returns within one year were 
positive and significant. The positive initial price momentum effect explained reasonably well the return 
behaviours exhibited because of the absence of small-firm effects. Once again, institutional investors 
preferred to invest in large firms. 
 
It was concluded that size effects appeared to dominate price momentum effects in strategy 
performance. If the short portfolio had the smaller stocks, then the cumulative returns of the portfolio 
would be consistently negative and significant. When the long portfolio has the smallest firms, overall 
returns were positive with no price reversals. In a strategic portfolio built using long positions in large 
stocks that previously outperformed and short positions in small stocks that previously underperformed, 
significant short- and long-term price reversals presented themselves and the long portfolio 
underperformed the short portfolio. Small-capitalisation stocks outperformed large-capitalisation 
stocks. Furthermore, institutional investors preferred to invest in large firms regardless of various 




investors preferred trading with momentum. The “momentum-price reversal anomaly” arose from the 
small-firm effect dominating the price reversal effect.  
 
2.2.9: Andrei and Cujean (2017) 
 
Andrei and Cujean (2017) proposed a joint theory to explain momentum and reversals. The theory 
was based on a rational-expectations framework, with several conditions set in place to better define 
their work and a specific concentration upon word-of-mouth communication, with the necessary 
condition that the marketplace contained both momentum and contrarian traders.  The necessary 
conditions for momentum and reversal to occur were then laid out, specifically the role of word-of-
mouth communication in propagating rumours that would cause a disjuncture between a security’s price 
and its underlying fundamentals, that would later be corrected by agents in the economy through either 
investing in or disinvesting out of the security as required by the correction of their expectations to 
match reality. It was also proved that, even though the model’s initial setup was static, it also extended 
to a dynamic setup. Furthermore, it was proved that it was impossible to eliminate momentum or 
reversals even for a hypothetical large, unconstrained risk-neutral arbitrageur for the simple reason that 
said person would still have to consider his or her unfavourable impact upon the security being traded. 
(Many sales would lower the security’s price; many purchases would raise it.) 
 
2.2.10: Rinne and Suominen (2017) 
 
Rinne and Suominen (2017) studied a pair trading strategy that used short-term market return 
reversals. The criteria applied were that the stocks were listed on the New York Stock Exchange, were 
priced at or above $5 at the end of the year in which the portfolio was formed, that the market 
capitalisation of the stocks exceeded the 10th percentile of NYSE stocks at the end of that year and that 
the stocks had a complete return history for that year. The top 20 stocks (or 100, in some cases) that had 
the highest weekly return correlation with each other were selected; pairs representing different share 
classes of the same company were excluded. Robustness was also tested for – the procedure was 
repeated using only stocks whose market capitalisations exceeded the 70th percentile of NYSE stocks.  
 
Expected five-day excess returns were obtained via regression on the previous 20 days of daily excess 
returns to obtain estimates of the stocks’ return reversal patterns; estimates of the pairs’ return reversal 
patterns were obtained via regressing the pairs’ expected five-day daily returns on the previous five 
days of daily returns. An assumption was added to the analysis: the investor would only implement such 
a strategy if the pairs’ expected returns exceeded some minimum required return (“trigger limit”), which 
would suffice to cover professional traders’ expected transaction costs for short-term long-short 
positions.  
 
Two strategies were considered – one wherein the positions were closed after five days and one where 
the positions were closed during a seven-day window beginning three days after implementation, on 
the first day in which the expected five-day return became negative. Details were not given regarding 
the first strategy. The second strategy yielded average returns per trade between 1% and 1.8%, 
depending on the sample size and trigger limit. Concentration on fewer pairs yielded higher returns. 
Usage of more pairs yielded reduced volatility. The strategy proved to be robust when only large-cap 
stocks were used. It was argued that the results proved that the type of pair trading under consideration 
was profitable during the sample period (January 1987 to December 2011), because the return estimates 
used exceeded the reasonable estimates of transaction costs faced by professional traders in such 
positions. The last test was for robust performance given standard risk factors. The pair trading returns 
of the top 100 pairs with a bi-directional trigger limit of 0.5% were considered. The average daily return 
was 0.1%; the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha was 0.09%, which turned out to be highly statistically 
significant. The results proved that standard risk factors did not drive the performance of the pair trading 
strategy.  
 
The authors also used Finnish data in their analysis. They analysed all the trades on the Helsinki Stock 




prices, closing prices and equity book values. Two regressions were conducted on the pair, one using 
returns derived from closing prices and the other from returns up to three hours before close of business. 
Results indicated that reversals were greatest on Mondays, Tuesdays and Fridays. The authors argued 
the Friday reversals were to be expected because the market makers had to bear more risk on any 
positions they held over the weekend due to the release of information over the weekend. Results 
indicated that there were significant return reversals in both regressions, affording traders the possibility 
to execute profitable pair trades on the days with the highest expected pair trading returns.  
 
Two strategies were considered, with the details having been as was stated two paragraphs above. 
Returns ranged between 1.46% for a 0.5% bi-directional trigger limit and 2.37% for a 1% bi-directional 
trigger limit. (A 0.5% bi-directional trigger limit, for example, implied the following: the share in 
question was sold if its expected return exceeded 0.5% and it was bought if its expected return was less 
than -0.5%). Brokerage firms incurred transaction costs lower than 0.4% in the trade. Transaction costs 
did increase with the size of the transaction, but the authors found that 1% remained reasonable. 
Increasing the threshold increased the returns per trade, although total returns decreased due to the 
reduction of viable trades. The above return estimates per transaction corresponded to annualised return 
estimates ranging between 113% and 238%. 
 
From the Finnish data, the conclusion was drawn that some financial institutions systematically 
exploited pair trading opportunities, earning substantial profits as compensation for providing liquidity 
to the market. Days with the highest expected trading returns had abnormally high trading volumes. 
The Finnish return data also indicated that return volatility could be as low as 4.2% with trading returns 
being as high as 2.4%. It must be noted that the results decayed towards the end of the sample period, 
which corresponded with the introduction of statistical arbitraging and other quantitative techniques. 
 
2.2.11: Zhang, Wang, Wang, Xing and Lei (2018) 
 
Zhang, Wang, Wang, Xing and Lei (2018) examined the impact of historical performance on present 
stock returns and constructed a modified Carhart (1997) model to capture said impact.  
 
[In the journal article On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, Carhart (1997) constructed models 
of performance measurement based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, Fama and French’s (1993) 
three-factor model and a model he had produced in an earlier paper (Carhart, 1995). The CAPM-based 
model had the following equation: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑉𝑊𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡. The three-factor model had the 
following equation: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖,𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖,𝑇𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡. The four-factor model 
had the following equation: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖,𝑇𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖,𝑇𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖,𝑇𝑃𝑅1𝑌𝑅𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡. 
For the equations, the variables were defined thusly. The return on an portfolio in excess of the one-
month T-bill return was denoted using ri,t. VWRF was the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. RMRF was the excess return on a value-weighted 
aggregate market proxy. SMB, HML and PR1YR were returns on value-weighted, zero-investment and 
factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity and one-year momentum in stock returns. 
The unexplained out- or underperformance of the portfolio was denoted using αi,T. The error term of 
the model was ei,t.] 
 
The sample consisted of A-shares (shares available for domestic investors) listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1992 to December 2015. (The sample period for the 
regression only begins in January 2007, however.) Weekly stock returns of SHSE and SZSE A-shares 
in the SinoFin economic and financial database were included. The first six months of returns for each 
stock were excluded, to exclude initial price anomalies caused by an IPO (initial public offering). Stocks 
with negative net asset values per share were excluded. Weekly stock returns, adjusted for dividends, 
were selected on Wednesdays.  
 
Portfolios were formed by sorting the sample firms on prior J days’ returns, with return breakpoints 




the firms’ performances over the observation periods directly influence the compositions of the 
portfolios) and holding periods were 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9 and 12 days, including 49 J-K strategies (the 
strategies are based on J-day returns and held for K days). Daily, weekly and monthly returns were 
winsorised each day, week and month at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. Momentum factors were 
constructed with a 1-week holding period and a formation period ranging from 1 to 250 weeks. The 
high trading frequency and low bid-ask spreads led the authors to not include lags between holding and 
formation weeks. Returns of individual stocks over the past J days were calculated in each week of 
sample intervals – the winners and losers were defined as the top and bottom 30% of performance in a 
formation period, respectively.   
 
In the sample of winner-minus-loser strategies with no lags, stock returns did reverse. The effect was 
especially significant in the short- and long-term. A portfolio with a 1-week formation period yielded 
an average return of -0.52. Market risk dominated in China, so homogeneous movements followed, and 
it was therefore uncommon for individual stocks to perform markedly differently from the market. 
Stocks also exhibited some degree of mean reversion following a large positive or negative event.  
 
The return to the momentum strategy for the preceding 2-week formation period was positive, which 
probably reflected “short term overreaction by overreaction” rather than investor under-reaction. It was 
claimed that no middle-term momentum effect existed and that the middle-term reversal effect was 
insignificant.  
 
Average returns to winner-minus-loser strategies over the 60-week formation period were significantly 
negative, suggesting a significantly long-term reversal effect. A long-term reversal phenomenon was 
more pronounced around the three-year formation period. Returns to winner-minus-loser strategies with 
formation periods longer than three years were less pronounced, yet still significantly negative.  
 
Volatilities of loser-minus-winner strategies with no lags from past 1-week to 250-week formation 
periods from 1997 to 2015, were stationary at around 0.02. Portfolio Sharpe ratios were higher in the 
short term than in other periods. It was argued that it was thus more valuable in China to invest based 
on short- and long-term past performance.  
 
Between 1997 and 2005, 30- to 60-week formation periods yielded few instances of the momentum 
effect in the middle term. From 2006 to 2015, winner-minus-loser portfolios yielded significantly 
negative returns; the momentum effect did not present. The returns to the portfolios without lags 
illustrated that the average weekly returns of 250 strategies changed between 1997 and 2005, from -
0.31% to 0.14%. The average returns between 2006 and 2015 were generally lower than those of the 
preceding period. If lags were included between 1997 and 2005, a momentum effect was observed in a 
few weeks, while portfolio returns experienced reversals during the 2006-2015 period (the 2-1 strategy 
excepted.) A possible explanation given was that people’s incomes increased between 2006 and 2015 
and the Internet expanded, while investors remained irrational and sensitive to market movements and 
increasingly speculative trading increased the reversal effect.  
 
Considering the lag-less momentum strategies, winner-minus-loser portfolios all yielded negative 
returns in bull markets, with a stronger reversal effect in bull markets than in bear markets. There were 
a few occasions of the momentum effect in the bear market period. In bull markets, investors were more 
willing to trade stocks – the resultant fast-in-fast-out trading amplified reversal effects.  
 
Fama-Macbeth two-step regressions were conducted to test short- and long-term reversal effects, with 
independent variables being winsorised weekly at the top and bottom 0.5%. Regressions of individual 
stock returns on past 1-week returns, with controls for size, book-to-market ratios, price-to-earnings 
ratios, turnover and beta included. Each year was divided into two six-month periods – market 
capitalisations, book values and price-earnings ratios were uploaded periodically. Market 
capitalisations and book-to-market ratios were updated annually in May because Chinese company 
results were released annually on 30 April. To eliminate positive skewness, authors used the natural 




used in the regressions. Individual stock betas were estimated using previous 2-year weekly returns in 
each period – if fewer than 50 weeks of data were available, they were recorded as missing.   
 
Individual stock returns in one week had very significant negative correlations with individual stock 
returns in the following week, especially when the regression was controlled for other factors (t=-7.35 
vs t=-9.96). the coefficient for 1997-2005 was smaller than that for 2006-2015, with the latter period 
having a stronger reversal effect. Returns were more significantly negatively autocorrelated in the bear 
market over a one-week period than in the bull market. When 52-week Fama-MacBeth regressions were 
constructed, it was found that the 52-week prior returns had weak predictive power and varied over the 
sample, thus leading to the conclusion that the classic momentum factor did not work well, and more 
bespoke modelling was required to better describe the Chinese stock market.  
 
Time series regressions were then constructed using weekly return data from January 1997 to December 
2015. The market portfolio yielded an average weekly excess return (equally-weighted A-share weekly 
returns above the risk-free interest rate) of 0.23%. The weekly average return to buying small-cap and 
selling large-cap stocks was 0.24%. HML yielded a statistically insignificant return of 0.01%. Selling a 
high price-to-earnings ratio portfolio and buying a low price-to-earnings ratio portfolio yielded 0.19% 
in weekly excess return. A super-short-term reversal effect was found – the 1-week winner-minus-loser 
portfolio yielded an average weekly return of -0.52%, which was highly significant.  
 
Factor spanning tests were also conducted, regressing one factor on the other four in the time series 
regression. Mr (excess market portfolio return) and HML regressions yielded insignificant results. 
Market risk was found to play a key role in explaining the excess returns of Chinese stocks. RMRf 
accounted for more than 80% of the portfolio returns in the regression results. The HML factor appeared 
to be redundant for explaining stock returns, as implied by the insignificant results from its factor 
spanning test. The price-to-earnings ratio proved to be more appropriate for representing business 
growth than the book-to-market ratio in China. A pervasive reversal effect also led to the selection of 
the short-term reversal factor instead of the one-year momentum factor. 
 
Weekly excess portfolio returns were sorted using past one-week performance. There appeared to be a 
negative relationship between past performance and current returns. Stocks in the lowest decile yielded 
average returns from 1-week formation portfolios of 0.4%; stocks in the highest decile, -0.25%. From 
1997 to 2005, the inter-decile spread was 0.18%, which was statistically insignificant. From 2006 to 
2015, the inter-decile spread was 1.12%, which was highly significant. The bull market yielded an inter-
decile spread of 0.86%; the bear market, 0.83%. There existed a tail-rising phenomenon in Decile One 
for both the bull market and bear market portfolios, illustrating that investors seemingly preferred to 
follow whatever trend presented (i.e. in bull markets, investor behaviour at the tails implied an 
inclination to be bullish and in bear markets, investor behaviour at the tails implied an inclination to be 
bearish). The arrival of important information made some stocks likely to show significant short-term 
momentum effects.  
 
Time-series regressions on the pricing factors were conducted. CAPM had an average explanatory 
power of 85.6%, indicating the dominance of market risk in the Chinese stock market. Alphas decreased 
monotonically throughout the sample, from 0.238 in the lowest decile to -0.382 in the highest. Portfolios 
with poorer past performance exhibited higher expected returns. The inter-decile spread had an alpha 
of 0.621, significantly positive. CAPM was unable to capture reversal effects. The inter-decile spread 
had a higher alpha to CAPM during the 2006-2015 period than during the 1997-2005 period; said alpha 
for the inter-decile spread was higher in the bull market than in the bear market. In the latter period, the 
reversal effect was more pronounced in the bull market after market risk adjustments.  
 
The alpha for the inter-decile spread to CAPM+WML1 was -0.025, significantly smaller than that of 
CAPM. CAPM+WML1 had an average explanatory power of 88.6%, with WML1 contributing nearly 
3%. Chinese stocks generally lack individuating characteristics due to the pronounced systemic risk 
present. Rather than basing investment decisions on company performance and characteristics, 




signals would cause short-term investor overreactions, followed by corrections once the true nature of 
underlying market movements was realised. Consequently, reversals would occur.  
 
Modified Fama-French three-factor regressions were then conducted. 10 portfolios had an average 
explanatory power of 91.1%, 5.5% more than CAPM. The “interceptions” decreased monotonically, 
however, from 0.127 in the first decile to -0.428 in the last. The short-term reversal effect could not be 
captured by fundamental information, as the significant positivity of the gaps demonstrated. When a 
one-week momentum factor was incorporated, the average R2 for the ten portfolios was 93.6% and the 
alpha for the inter-decile spread was a statistically insignificant -0.018. The marginal contribution 
WML1 made to the three-factor model was found to be significant and assistive in explaining portfolio 
returns.  
 
It was then questioned whether the proposed modified Carhart (1997) model explained the impact of 
the long-term reversal effect, to which effect 10 portfolios sorted by their performance over the 
preceding 156 weeks were constructed, with Decile One denoting the portfolio with the poorest returns. 
The inter-decile spread to the CAPM had an alpha of 0.298, which was statistically significant. 
Consistent with other market risk-adjusted regressions for one-week portfolio returns, any existent 
reversal effects were stronger in the latter period and in the bull market.  
 
Though WML1 contributed marginally to CAPM’s explanatory power, it did capture the reversal effect. 
Inter-decile spreads to the three-factor model had an alpha of 0.117; the average explanatory power for 
the ten portfolios was 92.7%. A modified Fama-French three-factor model was able to partially capture 
the long-term reversal effect, which indicated that long-term performance might partially depend upon 
a firm’s fundamental information.  
 
Semi-partial correlation coefficient squares were also looked at for ten portfolios with a one-week 
formation period. (Semi-partial correlation coefficients measured the independent impact of 
explanatory variables after excluding collinearity in a linear regression; semi-partial correlation 
coefficient squares reflected the independent weight of the explanatory variables in explaining the 
dependent variable). The market risk factor had the highest explanatory power regarding portfolio 
returns; the book-to-market ratio had the lowest. WML1 had an average explanatory power of 2.71% 
and only marginally explained stock returns. Chinese stock investors seemed to prefer short-term 
speculation rather than long-term growth. 
 
Portfolio returns were regressed on their proposed four-factor model, to test if it could effectively 
explain the anomalies. 10 portfolios were divided based on size, price-earnings ratios, book-to-market 
ratios and weekly turnover. Results from the F-tests performed indicated that size, price-earnings ratio 
and book-to-market effects could be well explained by the model, which could not explain trading 
volumes.  
 
The model was also tested out-of-sample. 10 portfolios were formed from the stocks, based on the 
preceding week’s returns, sizes, price-to-earnings ratios and returns on equity. A rolling 51-week time 
series regression slope was used – 50 weeks to calculate the coefficients; one week to forecast. Root 
mean square errors of the difference between real and predicted portfolio returns from 1998 to 2015 
were reported. The proposed model yielded smaller root mean square errors than CAPM and the Fama-
French three-factor model, suggesting that the proposed model had a better pricing fit. The proposed 
model worked better than the Fama-French and CAPM models for portfolios based on the preceding 
week’s returns and price-earnings ratios. The Fama-French model worked better for portfolios based 
on size and returns on equity. The models’ pricing and forecasting ability generally depended on the 
criterion used to arrange the stocks into portfolios. The short-term reversal effect for their proposed 
model was emphasised. The price-earnings ratio was used, rather than the book-to-market ratio. For the 
Fama-French model, the focus was on pricing factors concerning fundamental information. It was also 





Time-series regressions for value-weighted portfolios with holding period returns were conducted. The 
reversal strategies with a one-week formation period could gain weekly average profits of 0.441%. 
Super-short-term and long-term reversal effects were still significant. The CAPM and Fama-French 
three-factor models were unable to explain the difference in average returns across stocks with different 
short-term past performances. WML1 was able to explain the short-term reversal effect – it contributed 
3% to the explanatory power of CAPM and the modified three-factor Fama-French model. The 
modified FF+WML1, by contrast, was able to capture the super-short-term and long-term reversal 
effects. Reversal effects were less pronounced in value-weighted portfolios than in equally-weighted 
portfolios because large-cap stocks had heavier weights.  
 
Chinese stocks exhibited a significant reversal effect, rather than the middle-term momentum effect 
observed in the American stock market. One-month reversal factors were therefore constructed instead 
of the Carhart (1997) one-year momentum factor. It was shown that the reversal effect was pronounced 
for monthly data and could not be captured by the CAPM and three-factor models. 
 
Firm size was controlled for in an investigation of reversal strategy returns. Stocks were sorted 
according to their market capitalisation in the last period and divided into three groups based on size, 
namely the top and bottom 30%, and the middle 40%. Each subsample contained 10 portfolios sorted 
by past performance. Reversals in middle- and small-cap stocks were stronger than in large-cap stocks. 
Prices changed dramatically in China, especially for small firms. Small-cap stocks showed larger 
reversal effects because they were more vulnerable to large capital movements.  
 
The stocks in the sample were divided into the top 30%, middle 40% and bottom 30% according to 
turnover, which were then used to measure trading volume. 10 portfolios were constructed in each 
group, sorted by past performance. In the portfolios with one-week formation periods, the inter-decile 
spread in the high trading volume group was 0.545, significantly higher than in the middle (0.395) and 
low trading volume groups (0.214). In high trading volume subsamples, WML1 contributed 2.3% to 
the explanatory power of the Fama-French three-factor model. Recent high trading volume made prices 
very volatile. Stock returns were highly and significantly correlated to historical returns – more 
aggressive trading activity intensified the link.  
 
Prices were more likely to bias the market in the case of high-beta stocks, so the overreaction would 
cause a reversal. Given Chinese stocks’ general lack of individuating characteristics, beta represented 
the investors’ sensitivity to past information. It was theorised that an increase in beta would intensify 
the reversals. Stocks were sorted by their betas into three subsamples (top 30%, middle 40% and bottom 
30%). In one-week formation portfolios, the inter-decile spread for the high-beta portfolios was 0.783, 
larger than in the middle-beta (0.693) and low-beta (0.440) groups. The more volatile the market was, 
the stronger the reversal effect observed. 
 
It was concluded that selling outperforming stocks and buying underperforming ones could indeed 
generate “riskless” profits. A reversal strategy built using one-week formation portfolios yielded 0.52% 
in riskless profits, more than yielded by any other strategy. Heavy policy intervention and irrational 
investment made it difficult for high-quality stocks to distinguish themselves from the rest, so stock 
return movements were likely to be “choppy”. Short-term reversals reflected investors’ sensitivity to 
information and tendency to follow the trend; long-term reversals were due to mean reversion that took 
place once investors had accumulated enough information to see that they had initially overreacted. 
Most Chinese media coverage tended to recommend stocks with low price-to-earnings ratios and retail 
investors had little interest in business growth. They argued finally that, for Chinese stock markets to 
develop soundly, it was essential to strengthen the market function to encourage investment in high-






2.3: Literature Review (Arguments in Support of Further Research) 
 
In Portfolio Selection, Harry Markowitz (1952) first introduced the ideas of the efficient frontier and 
the risk-return trade-off to the world of finance. He argued that each investor would assemble for him- 
or herself a portfolio that minimised the expected risk to which the capital would be exposed and 
maximised the expected return on that capital. He further argued that the optimal portfolio for such an 
investor would fall upon the efficient frontier and that each investor, being subject to the risk-return 
trade-off, would prefer a portfolio with a higher expected return and a lower expected risk, subject to 
the investor’s investing specifications and constraints. The efficient frontier is the set of all possible 
long-only portfolios that maximise the expected return, for a given amount of risk taken on by the 
investor. The risk-return trade-off is the consequent idea that for one to assemble a portfolio with a high 
expected return, one must be willing to face high expected risk.  
 
From Markowitz’s work, and the work of later authors, came the idea in modern portfolio theory that 
an investor had to be involved in the market’s activities to receive a return on the market’s activities, 
i.e. one had to have a position in the market to derive any benefit from the market and in the absence of 
any such position, one could not derive any benefit from the market.   
 
In Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Eugene Fama (1970) first 
outlined the three forms of what has come to be known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The weak 
form argued that all historical information regarding a security was included in its current price, 
implying that security prices followed random walks because it was impossible for anyone to earn 
abnormal profits from using past prices to predict future ones (i.e. through technical analysis). The semi-
strong form argued that a security’s price contained all available public information about that security 
and, furthermore, adjusted rapidly to any new information that arose, thus eliminating the possibility of 
using either fundamental or technical analysis to earn abnormal profits. The strong form argued, finally, 
that a security’s price reflected all public and private information pertaining to that security, which 
implied that no investor could consistently outperform the market. 
 
The semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis argued against the existence of momentum 
and reversal events in security prices, as momentum implied a measure of predictive power in past 
prices and reversals implied that not all public information about a security was factored into its price. 
Momentum allowed the possibility of an investor examining past prices, assembling a portfolio of 
stocks and then disinvesting from that portfolio at a later stage, such that whatever underlying trend 
implied by the past prices would have been maximally utilised as a source of abnormal profits (subject 
to the usual bounds upon human knowledge such as non-omniscience and non-precognition, which 
would produce an imperfect result). Reversals allowed the possibility of an investor constructing a 
portfolio in such a way as to use currently available public information to take contrarian bets regarding 
the subsequent movements of various securities, then consistently profiting therefrom, thus 
outperforming the market. 
 
The strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis entailed the arguments of the semi-strong form. It 
also implied the impossibility of generating a significant positive cash return from the market’s 
activities by means of holding a synthetic zero position, because holding a synthetic zero position was 
logically equivalent to having no net position in the market at all and (in concurrence with Markowitz 
[1952]) if one was effectively taking on zero risk, then one should expect zero returns. To obtain a 
positive cash return from a synthetic zero position would be to effectively outperform the market for 
the simple reason that any return derived from the market would have had a certain level of risk that 
said investor would have had to take, but the holder of the synthetic zero position would have effectively 
taken on no risk at all.    
 
The ideas contained in Fama (1970), while initially of theoretical interest to financial professionals as 
indicative of a reality contrary to what they sought to produce daily through active investing, only 
gained traction among members of the public in recent times. The Efficient Market Hypothesis gained 




the Efficient Markets Hypothesis originating index tracker funds to facilitate the practice of passive 
investing and notable figures such as Warren Buffett publicly advocating index funds as an investment 
vehicle.   
 
(In 2007, Warren Buffett made a $1,000,000 bet with Protégé Partners that an index fund would 
outperform a collection of hedge funds over a ten-year period. He proceeded to win the bet on 29 
December 2017 [Protégé Partner’s basket of hedge funds yielded 2.2% on average per annum; the S&P 
500 yielded 7.1% per annum] and donated his winnings to the Omaha, Nebraska-based affiliate of Girls 
Inc., a charity that provides after-school care and summer programmes for girls aged 5 to 18 [Price, 
2017]. In an interview with CNBC’s On the Money, Warren Buffett also said, “Consistently buy an 
S&P 500 low-cost index fund. I think it’s the thing that makes the most sense practically all of the time” 
[Martin, 2018].) 
 
Return reversals were best defined as reversals in the trend of the movements of the price of a tradeable 
asset. For example, suppose that a given tradeable asset had been falling in price over a given number 
of days. Suppose that said asset’s price rose on a given day and continued to rise for a given number of 
days. The event of the trend in the returns to the holder changing direction from negative to positive, 
would be a return reversal.  
 
Return reversals were not a new phenomenon in finance. One of the earliest observations of return 
reversals in markets was by Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966), who sought to discover laws of price 
fluctuations in the stock market through examination of the correspondence between ticker price 
movements and the predictions of the random walk hypothesis. They analysed the complete set of ticker 
prices for six of the first seven stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the trading days of 
October 1964. They concluded the following: 
1. That there existed a general tendency for price reversals between trades; 
2. That reversals were relatively more concentrated at integer prices (in US Dollars) where “stable 
slow-moving participants offer to buy and sell”; 
3. That there was a concentration of particular types of reversals just above and below integer 
prices; 
4. That fast-moving competitors who were aware of the behaviours of the slower-moving market 
participants would be in a good position to enter positions at suitable non-integer prices so as 
to set themselves up to profit off the reversal trade that would follow; 
5. And that after two or more price changes in the same direction, the probability of the price trend 
continuing in a given direction after those changes exceeded the probability of a price trend 
continuing in a given direction after two or more changes in opposite directions. 
 
Authors who investigated the profitability of the return reversal strategy as implemented using costless 
portfolios generally agreed that successful implementation could indeed produce significant positive 
cash returns from what would essentially be a net zero position in the market.  
 
Jegadeesh (1990) tested for significant serial correlation in stock returns using data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices for the period 1929-1982. Following his finding said significant serial 
correlations, he used data from 1934 to 1987 to test for and identify highly significant abnormal returns, 
obtained from portfolios constructed in such a way as to presumably take advantage of the predicted 
returns of stocks. 
 
Lehmann (1990) made a significant contribution to the study of reversals as a canonically “anomalous” 
financial phenomenon. Lehmann (1990) studied market efficiency by testing the profits of costless 
portfolios consisting of short positions in stocks that recently outperformed the market and long 
positions in stocks that recently underperformed the market, using daily return data from 1962 to 1990 
for equity securities listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges. He found that the costless 
portfolio yielded positive returns in approximately 90% of the weeks of the study and, if viewed in six-
month periods, in each of the 49 periods covered by the data. He also found that the measured arbitrage 




the factoring in of plausible transaction costs. He noted that there was “little persistence” in return 
reversal effects, which he argued gave rise to two potential responses: that one could claim equity 
markets are on average efficient over longer periods, e.g. a month, or that the tests used had low power 
and that additional evidence of market inefficiency was required. 
 
Subsequent to the work of Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990), investigations by other authors, such 
as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Mei and Gao (1995), Booth, Fung and Leung (2016), Rinne and 
Suominen (2017) and Zhang et al. (2018), provided further evidence that the profitability of the return 
reversal strategy was not a glitch observed only by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) but was 
indeed a consistent and long-lasting financial occurrence, not just in the American stock market but also 
in the stock markets of other countries, such as Finland (Rinne and Suominen, 2017), China (Zhang et 
al., 2018), Tunisia (Boussaidi, 2017), Turkey (Bildik and Gülay, 2007) and Japan (Gunaratne and 
Yonesawa, 1997). Evidence of reversals was also found in non-equity financial markets such as fixed 
income (Khang and King, 2004). The authors agreed with Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann’s (1990) 
conclusions that there was sufficient evidence to reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
 
De Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012) looked into the seemingly high trading costs involved in the 
implementation of the costless return reversal strategy – they found that the high trading costs came 
about due to excessive trading in small-cap stocks and that restriction of one’s universe to large-cap 
stocks would serve to reduce trading costs and increase trading profits even with an investor using the 
most elementary methodology available for the purpose. They also demonstrated that implementing a 
modified, smarter methodology maximised one’s abnormal profits from the strategy’s implementation. 
 
Andrei and Cujean (2017) produced a mathematical model demonstrating the link between momentum 
and reversals and the necessary conditions for either phenomenon to arise; furthermore, they proved 
that all persons in the market would experience momentum and reversal effects in their portfolios, even 
hypothetical large, unconstrained risk-neutral arbitrageurs, for the simple reason that said persons would 
still have to consider his or her unfavourable impact upon the security being traded (an example of 
diminishing marginal utility in action, many sales would lower a security’s price and many purchases 
would raise it for the simple reason that there would only be so many shares available for purchase or 
sale at a given price before one would have to trade at the next applicable price to satisfy one’s orders). 
 
In conclusion, what the literature has indicated is that, rather than being anomalies unexplainable by 
rational finance, momentum, reversals and their related strategies are well documented and well 
researched financial phenomena that an investor is likely still able to exploit today. There is concurrence 
among some authors that it is theoretically possible to construct a synthetic zero position in the market, 
which generates significant positive cash returns. However, many practitioners and scholars of modern 
finance continue to believe that the Efficient Market Hypothesis holds.  
 
If it is conclusively proven that it is possible to generate significant positive cash returns from holding 
a net zero position in a given market, there are significant ramifications for financial theory and practice. 
 
Markowitz (1952) argued that it should be impossible for an investor to construct a zero-investment 
portfolio that then proceeds to generate positive cash returns for that investor, because an investor must 
take on some form of actual risk to realise an actual return. If an investor succeeded in constructing a 
zero-cost portfolio that proceeded to generate significant positive cash returns, then said investor would 
have succeeded in deriving positive benefits from market activities despite effectively holding a net 
zero position in the market and thus being practically uninvolved in the market’s activities. Proof of the 
possibility of generating a significant positive cash return from a net zero position will necessitate re-
examination of the efficient frontier concept and, by extension, of modern portfolio theory as investors 
will now have the option of constructing portfolios with effectively zero cost and minimum risk, which 
will allow for more investment opportunities and will require the development of new supporting 





Fama (1970) argued that it was impossible for any investor to construct a portfolio that outperformed 
the market over a given period, because share prices reflected all public and private information about 
those shares, thus implying the impossibility of extracting any trading advantage for oneself by any 
direct action that one could take with the information at one’s disposal. By extension, for an investor’s 
portfolio to outperform the market over a given period, said investor would have to essentially be lucky 
and it is only to said investor’s luck that such success would be attributable. If an investor succeeded in 
using public information and insights drawn therefrom to construct a zero-cost portfolio that proceeded 
to outperform the market, then said investor would have succeeded in disproving the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis because said investor would have taken active measures to apply public information to his 
or her trading and derived tangible benefits therefrom, thereby obtaining success that would only be 
partially attributable to luck, unlike in the case where the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is true and the 
investor’s success is solely attributable to luck. While this would be unlikely to dissuade passive 
investors from continuing to invest passively, this would serve as solid evidence in favour of active 
investing, which has suffered a loss of esteem in the years following the onset of the Great Recession. 
  
More evidence is needed of the pervasiveness of the momentum-reversal phenomenon. Most studies 
thereof predate the crash of 29 September 2008, so a study spanning that day is required to investigate 
if the profitability of the costless reversal strategy that was observed in US markets before the crash is 
also observable after the crash, in which period one would expect different investor behaviour because 
of the general increase in risk aversion that would have followed the major losses incurred by numerous 
investors in the global markets, especially the US stock market – the largest stock market on the planet, 
where the losses occurred first and were most psychologically scarring. Evidence of continued 
profitability will serve to provide conclusive proof that the observations of prior authors regarding the 
failure of the Efficient Market Hypothesis were not just a pre-crash phenomenon but represent a 
continuing trend to be taken note of and capitalised upon post-crash. 
 
Once said evidence is obtained, there will then be room for practitioners to use the theoretical proof as 
a basis for a new form of investing, one which entails no risk and yet generates high rewards – portfolios, 
in other words, with infinite or almost infinite Sharpe (1966) ratios. Said portfolios will have their 
constraints, naturally – the costless portfolios imply the use of short sales, so margin requirements and 
borrowing costs will be imposed on the holders of the synthetic zero positions by the actual owners of 
the stocks that are being sold short; furthermore, different jurisdictions have different legal restrictions 
and requirements that apply to financial markets, specifically to short sales, with which all involved 
parties must comply. But the existence of the empirical possibility will avail opportunities for profit, 
which will be pursued by investors and practitioners, thus finally leading to the conclusive disproof of 










For each of the 1000 costless long-short portfolios that will be analysed as part of this investigation, the 
null and alternative hypotheses were the following.  
 
1. The null hypothesis (H0) was that the average cash return from the long-short portfolio, 
irrespective of formation and holding periods, was zero. 
 
2. The alternative hypothesis (H1) was that the average cash return from the long-short portfolio, 
irrespective of formation and holding periods, was larger or smaller than zero. 
 
The reasons why the benchmark against which the average cash returns of the long-short portfolios 
were tested, was zero were the following. 
 
The long-short portfolios that were tested were constructed in such a way as to be synthetic zero 
positions in the market. They had no net position in the market at all. Consequently, to test the 
performance of the synthetic zero positions for statistical significance, their performance had to be 
compared to that of an actual zero position. Testing the performance of the zero-cost long-short 
portfolios against a long position-only benchmark (such as the cash yield over a period of a market 
index) would have been inappropriate because such a comparison would have been of two different 
things and such an “apples and pears” scenario could not be expected to yield meaningful insights.  
 
US inflation would likewise have been an inappropriate benchmark against which to test the 
performance of the zero-cost long-short portfolios. Inflation measures the rate at which one’s money 
loses real purchasing power. It is consequently a benchmark suitable for a long-only portfolio because 
it measures the decline in real value of money that one holds. The long-short portfolios in this 
investigation were constructed and rebalanced in such a way as to have no net position in the market at 
all. Testing their performance against inflation would have been inappropriate because such a 
comparison would have compared “apples and pears” and such comparisons could not be expected to 
yield meaningful insights. Note that while the long-short portfolios in this investigation were 
constructed and rebalanced in such a way as to have no cash holding remaining after rebalancing, in 
reality a cash holding would arise after rebalancing. That cash holding would likely be held in a return-
yielding vehicle for the duration of the holding period of the portfolio, after which it would grow or 
shrink in size depending upon the performance of the long-short portfolio over the preceding holding 
period. This cash holding, adjusting as it would over holding periods, would keep up with inflation and 








The sample data were the daily returns for the shares of the 780 companies listed on the NASDAQ and 
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), which fell within the top 500 listed companies by market 
capitalisation between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2017, as listed on the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Index (“the S & P 500”). The S & P 500 was rebalanced approximately every three months – if a 
company met the criteria for S & P 500 listing in any of the quarters within the sample period, then it 
was included in the investigation. The list of companies was compiled using Bloomberg. The data for 
said companies were obtained from the archives of the NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange 
using Eikon. The full list of companies included in the sample is given in Appendix 1. 
 
The top 500 shares were chosen for their size and liquidity, in keeping with observations by De Groot, 
Huij and Zhou (2012) about the adverse effects upon reversal strategy profitability of excessive trading 
in small-cap stocks. The New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ are the largest and second-largest 
markets in the world, by total capitalisation. Their collected top 500 stocks were therefore highly likely 
to be sufficiently liquid for inclusion in a reversal strategy, which should reduce trading costs. Said 
companies’ stocks would also have been included in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (“the S & P 500”) 
in that period (the S & P 500 shares are the shares of the companies listed on either the NASDAQ or 
the NYSE, whose market capitalisations place them within the top 500 most valuable companies in the 
USA). Consequently, the investigation would also have yielded useful insight about whether an investor 
could have earned a significant positive cash return from investing using the S & P 500 stocks, which 
surpassed the return yielded by the S & P 500 and yet had less risk involved. Given the size of the US 
stock markets, numerous reversal events were also expected. 
 
The sample period was from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2017. This period allowed analysis of the 
reversal strategy’s profitability before, during and after the bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble, 
which is marked by the decline of the Dow Jones Industrial Average by 777.68 points on 29 September 
2008 (Twin, 2008). This period also allowed testing of the reversal strategy’s long-term profitability, 
which will be of some interest to investors seeking a stable, consistent means whereby they can 








The methodology applied was as follows.  
 
The shares were ranked in descending order of performance per period. Sub-samples of 100 and 500 
shares were selected. Once selected, the sub-samples of shares were divided into twentieths. Reversal 
portfolios were constructed therefrom through the combination of twentieths, using a method 
hereinafter referred to as the extreme quantiles method. 
 
The extreme quantiles method took into consideration how far apart the twentieths were from each 
other. Each reversal portfolio consisted of equally weighted long positions in the shares of the kth-worst-
performing twentieth and equally weighted short positions in the shares of the kth-best-performing 
twentieth, where the twentieths were chosen in such a way as to be equidistant from the median of the 
sub-sample and k was a whole number between one and ten. For example, reversal portfolio one 
consisted of equally weighted long positions in the worst-performing twentieth and equally weighted 
short positions in the best-performing twentieth; reversal portfolio two consisted of equally weighted 
long positions in the second-worst twentieth and equally weighted short positions in the second-best 
twentieth; reversal portfolio three consisted of equally weighted long positions in the third-worst 
twentieth and equally weighted short positions in the third-best twentieth, etc. The combination of a 
long position in a relatively underperforming twentieth and a short position in a relatively outperforming 
twentieth provided a zero-cost reversal portfolio. 
 
The portfolios created using the above methods were run over three time periods: the period between 1 
January 2005 and 26 September 2008 (the pre-crash period), the period from 29 September 2008 to 31 
December 2017 (the post-crash period) and the period between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2017 
(the entire sample period). The reason for the splits was to assess the profitability of the short-term 
reversal strategy if consistently applied before 29 September 2008, after 29 September 2008 and over 
the entire sample period. (On 29 September 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 777.68 points, 
the largest one-day point drop in its history. The Standard and Poor’s 500 Index lost 8.8% of its value 
that day and the NASDAQ Composite Index’s value fell by 9.1%. Said declines generally served as 
confirmation of the bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble that had previously dominated American 
and global markets. One would expect investor behaviour before and after the crash to differ 
significantly [Twin, 2008].) 
 
The long-short positions to be constructed were costless (i.e. the long positions were financed entirely 
by the short positions). The zero net position thus ensured the creation of the synthetic zero positions in 
the market that were used to test the null hypothesis for each portfolio. 
 
The formation period was the period over which the shares’ returns were calculated. The shares were 
ranked based upon those returns and the portfolios were constructed accordingly thereafter, using the 
methods detailed above. The holding period was the period over which the portfolio was held before 
the investor rebalanced it and drew his or her cash return. The possible formation and holding periods 
were one calendar day, seven calendar days, fourteen calendar days, twenty-one calendar days and 
twenty-eight calendar days. There were therefore twenty-five cases to be considered in this 
investigation.  
 
Two analyses were conducted. The first was conducted on the basis that the investor observed the 
desired data at the end of the formation period and implemented the reversal strategy immediately 
thereafter. The second analysis was run on the basis that the investor skipped a day before implementing 
the reversal strategy. The two analyses’ results would provide information regarding if the profitability 
of the reversal strategy was influenced in any way by the investor’s speed of implementation.  
 






The underpinning assumptions of this investigation were that the investor was able to purchase and sell 
as many shares as were necessary at exactly the closing price for the day of trade, that the weightings 
of the shares in the reversal portfolios and their constituent twentieths were always equal and that the 
investor was always able to balance the net position of the portfolio prior to implementation. 
 
The two-sample t-test for samples of unequal size with unequal variances (Welch, 1947) was used to 
test the null hypothesis. The formula for the t-statistic was given by the following equation (Equation 
1): 
 










           (1) 
 
𝑋1 and 𝑋2 were the first and second sample means.  
𝑠1
2 and 𝑠2
2 were the first and second sample variances.  
𝑁1 and 𝑁2 were the first and second sample sizes. 
 
The hypotheses for the t-tests were as follows. 
 
1. The null hypothesis (H0) was that the first and second sample means were equal in size.  
 
2. The alternative hypothesis (H1) was that the first and second sample means differed in size.  
 
Two-sample t-tests for samples of unequal size with unequal variances were used to test the null 
hypothesis, because the true average cash returns of the reversal portfolios, which were to be estimated 
in this investigation, were assumed to be normally distributed. Statistical theory dictated that, where a 
sample with a given number of observations was drawn from a normal distribution, the sample mean 
would follow a t-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the sample size less 1. The zero position 







Chapter 4: Results 
 
1000 costless portfolios were constructed for 25 different formation and holding period combinations. 
Two-sided T-tests were conducted on the portfolios to test the significance of their performances over 
three time periods: the period before 29 September 2008, the period from 29 September 2008 onwards 
and the entire sample period. The chosen one-sided level of significance for the T-tests was 5% (0.05) 
- a test result was only deemed statistically significant if its p-value was less than 5%. The contents of 
this chapter serve to illustrate the key findings from the investigation. 
 
The key for the tables below is as follows (Appendix 2). 
 
“Extreme” indicates that the portfolio in question was constructed using the extreme quantiles method. 
 
“100” or “500” indicates that the portfolio was constructed as a quantile of 100 or 500 shares, 
respectively. 
 
“Run Immediately” or “Run” indicates that the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately 
after the designated formation period closed. 
 
“Skip a Day” or “Run Skip” indicates that the investor waited a day after the designated formation 
period closed before implementing the reversal strategy. 
 
“Portfolio k” indicates that the portfolio was constructed using Quantile k, which consisted of equally 
weighted long positions in the twentieth of the shares in the sub-sample at position 21-k and equally 
weighted short positions in the twentieth of the shares at position k. 
 
The shorthand notation for naming the 25 cases analysed gives the formation period first, followed by 
the holding period, joined by a hyphen.  
 
“D” indicates a period of one calendar day. 
 
“D7” indicates a period of seven calendar days. 
 
“D14” indicates a period of fourteen calendar days. 
 
“D21” indicates a period of twenty-one calendar days. 
 
“D28” indicates a period of twenty-eight calendar days.  
 
 
For example, “D14-D21” indicates that the formation period for the portfolio was fourteen calendar 







Table 2 details the worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, before the crash on 29 September 2008.  
 
The Worst-Performing Portfolios for Each of the Four Types of Reversal Portfolio, Before the Crash 




Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 246.00 Days 246.00 
Total -11775.9037% Total -44453.4144% 
Mean -47.8695% Mean -180.7049% 
Std. Error 65.6837% Std. Error 154.0127% 
t-statistic -11.43060707 t-statistic -18.40268329 
p-value 7.80927E-25 p-value 2.19375E-48 
 




Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 81.00 Days 244.00 
Total -1111.2783% Total -13745.7875% 
Mean -13.7195% Mean -56.3352% 
Std. Error 42.2388% Std. Error 99.2545% 
t-statistic -2.923270078 t-statistic -8.865934034 
p-value 0.002251394 p-value 8.31298E-17 
Table 2: the worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, before the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D7 combination generally exhibited the worst performance for quantiles of both 100 and 
500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the worst performance was exhibited by portfolios with 14 calendar day formation periods, 
though the holding periods differed (21 calendar days, for 100 stocks and 7 calendar days for 500 stocks). The worst-performing pre-crash portfolio was Extreme 




Table 3 details the worst-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, before the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
The Worst-Performing Portfolios, With the Most Significant Results, Before the Crash 




Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 246.00 Days 246.00 
Total -14928.1689% Total -44453.4144% 
Mean -60.6836% Mean -180.7049% 
Std. Error 66.5347% Std. Error 154.0127% 
t-statistic -14.305097 t-statistic -18.40268329 
p-value 1.87124E-34 p-value 2.19375E-48 
 




Portfolio 3 Portfolio 1 
Days 81.00 Days 244.00 
Total -925.0378% Total -13745.7875% 
Mean -11.4202% Mean -56.3352% 
Std. Error 37.8846% Std. Error 99.2545% 
t-statistic -2.713030622 t-statistic -8.865934034 
p-value 0.004080468 p-value 8.31298E-17 
Table 3: the worst-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, before the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D7 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of both 100 
and 500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the most significant results were yielded by two portfolios, one with a 21 calendar day 
formation period and the other with a 14 calendar day formation period. The worst-performing pre-crash portfolio with the most significant results was 




Table 4 details the worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, after the crash on 29 September 2008.  
 
The Worst-Performing Portfolios for Each of the Four Types of Reversal Portfolio, After the Crash 




Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 431.00 Days 431.00 
Total -15333.7487% Total -54018.6032% 
Mean -35.5771% Mean -125.3332% 
Std. Error 33.7992% Std. Error 69.7328% 
t-statistic -21.85259461 t-statistic -37.31366049 
p-value 4.75829E-72 p-value 3.1917E-137 
  
Skip a Day 
Case D28-D28 Case D14-D7 
Portfolio 2 Portfolio 1 
Days 121.00 Days 430.00 
Total -1224.4862% Total -18450.8607% 
Mean -10.1197% Mean -42.9090% 
Std. Error 41.9465% Std. Error 59.6356% 
t-statistic -2.653785615 t-statistic -14.92026887 
p-value 0.00451889 p-value 3.77409E-41 
Table 4: the worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, after the crash. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D7 combination generally exhibited the worst performance for quantiles of both 100 and 
500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the worst performance was exhibited by portfolios with 28 calendar day formation and holding 
periods (for 100 stocks) as well as 14 calendar day formation periods and 7 calendar day holding periods (for 500 stocks). The worst-performing post-crash 
portfolio was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1) – the investor would have lost on average approximately 1.25 US cents a day or $540.19 over the 431 weeks 




Table 5 details the worst-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, after the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
The Most Underperforming Portfolios, With the Most Significant Results, After the Crash 




Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 431.00 Days 431.00 
Total -19344.0546% Total -54018.6032% 
Mean -44.8818% Mean -125.3332% 
Std. Error 34.6854% Std. Error 69.7328% 
t-statistic -26.86347693 t-statistic -37.31366049 
p-value 2.49416E-94 p-value 3.1917E-137 
 




Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 430.00 Days 430.00 
Total -1219.2740% Total -18450.8607% 
Mean -2.8355% Mean -42.9090% 
Std. Error 13.9088% Std. Error 59.6356% 
t-statistic -4.227441845 t-statistic -14.92026887 
p-value 1.44508E-05 p-value 3.77409E-41 
Table 5: the worst-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, after the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D7 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of both 100 
and 500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the D14-D7 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of 
both 100 and 500 shares. The worst-performing post-crash portfolio with the most significant results was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1) – the p-value 




Table 6 details the worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, for the entire sample period.  
 
The Worst-Performing Portfolios for Each of the Four Types of Reversal Portfolio, for the Entire Sample Period 




Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 677.00 Days 677.00 
Total -27109.6524% Total -98472.0176% 
Mean -40.0438% Mean -145.4535% 
Std. Error 48.2214% Std. Error 111.3559% 
t-statistic -21.60676609 t-statistic -33.98640485 
p-value 1.99793E-79 p-value 1.0297E-148 
 




Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 338.00 Days 674.00 
Total -1696.6025% Total -32196.6481% 
Mean -5.0195% Mean -47.7695% 
Std. Error 48.2878% Std. Error 76.5883% 
t-statistic -1.911103014 t-statistic -16.19265884 
p-value 0.028419746 p-value 2.39112E-50 
Table 6: the worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, for the entire sample period. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D7 combination generally exhibited the worst performance for quantiles of both 100 and 
500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the worst performance was exhibited by portfolios with one calendar day formation periods 
and 14 calendar day holding periods (for 100 stocks) as well as 14 calendar day formation periods and 7 calendar day holding periods (for 500 stocks). The 
worst-performing portfolio for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1) – the investor would have lost on average approximately 1.45 




Table 7 details the worst-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, for the entire sample period. 
 
The Most Underperforming Portfolios, With the Most Significant Results, For the Entire Sample Period 




Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 677.00 Days 677.00 
Total -34272.2235% Total -98472.0176% 
Mean -50.6237% Mean -145.4535% 
Std. Error 49.2700% Std. Error 111.3559% 
t-statistic -26.73410224 t-statistic -33.98640485 
p-value 2.7385E-108 p-value 1.0297E-148 
 




Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 674.00 Days 674.00 
Total -1766.5130% Total -32196.6481% 
Mean -2.6209% Mean -47.7695% 
Std. Error 16.0687% Std. Error 76.5883% 
t-statistic -4.234549704 t-statistic -16.19265884 
p-value 1.30435E-05 p-value 2.39112E-50 
Table 7: the worst-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, for the entire sample period. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D7 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of both 100 
and 500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the D14-D7 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of 
both 100 and 500 shares. The worst-performing portfolio for the entire sample period with the most significant results was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 




Table 8 details the best-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, before the crash on 29 September 2008.  
 
The Best-Performing Portfolios for Each of the Four Types of Reversal Portfolio, Before the Crash 




Case D7-D7 Case D7-D21 
Portfolio 6 Portfolio 4 
Days 245.00 Days 81.00 
Total 634.9888% Total 1343.0825% 
Mean 2.5918% Mean 16.5813% 
Std. Error 23.9988% Std. Error 87.0541% 
t-statistic 1.690414826 t-statistic 1.714237134 
p-value 0.046112826 p-value 0.045178609 
 




Portfolio 4 Portfolio 3 
Days 920.00 Days 938.00 
Total 578.5636% Total 2646.8811% 
Mean 0.6289% Mean 2.8218% 
Std. Error 6.6928% Std. Error 21.0632% 
t-statistic 2.850030103 t-statistic 4.103066689 
p-value 0.002234627 p-value 2.21597E-05 
Table 8: the best-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, before the crash. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D7-D7 combination exhibited the best performance for quantiles of 100 shares and the D7-
D21 combination exhibited the best performance for 500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the best performance was exhibited by 
portfolios with 28 calendar day formation periods and one calendar day holding periods (for 100 stocks) as well as one calendar day formation and holding 
periods (for 500 stocks). The best-performing portfolio for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3) – the investor would have 





Table 9 details the best-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, before the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
The Best-Performing Portfolios, With the Most Significant Results, Before the Crash 




Case D28-D Case D28-D14 
Portfolio 4 Portfolio 6 
Days 921.00 Days 95.00 
Total 628.0247% Total 1085.0373% 
Mean 0.6819% Mean 11.4214% 
Std. Error 7.3748% Std. Error 53.6351% 
t-statistic 2.806041813 t-statistic 2.075554198 
p-value 0.002560634 p-value 0.020333157 
 




Portfolio 6 Portfolio 3 
Days 938.00 Days 938.00 
Total 627.8192% Total 2646.8811% 
Mean 0.6693% Mean 2.8218% 
Std. Error 6.9863% Std. Error 21.0632% 
t-statistic 2.934185073 t-statistic 4.103066689 
p-value 0.001712907 p-value 2.21597E-05 
Table 9: the best-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, before the crash. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D28-D combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of 100 
shares and the D28-D14 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of 500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before 
implementation, the D-D combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of both 100 and 500 shares. The best-performing pre-crash 
portfolio with the most significant results was Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3) – the p-value of that portfolio was insignificantly different from zero 




Table 10 details the best-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, after the crash on 29 September 2008.  
 
The Best-Performing Portfolios for Each of the Four Types of Reversal Portfolio, After the Crash 




Case D21-D Case D-D 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
Days 2331.00 Days 2331.00 
Total 971.4251% Total 3392.4604% 
Mean 0.4167% Mean 1.4554% 
Std. Error 14.8530% Std. Error 26.6218% 
t-statistic 1.354636592 t-statistic 2.639405934 
p-value 0.087832353 p-value 0.004180252 
   
Skip a Day 
Case D-D28 Case D21-D7 
Portfolio 5 Portfolio 2 
Days 121.00 Days 431.00 
Total 935.5565% Total 2256.0287% 
Mean 7.7319% Mean 5.2344% 
Std. Error 29.3641% Std. Error 41.7063% 
t-statistic 2.896409505 t-statistic 2.605580946 
p-value 0.002243502 p-value 0.004745023 
Table 10: the best-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, after the crash. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D21-D combination exhibited the best performance for quantiles of 100 shares and the D-D 
combination exhibited the best performance for 500 shares. If the investor skipped a day before implementation, the best performance was exhibited by portfolios 
with one calendar day formation periods and 28 calendar day holding periods (for 100 stocks) as well as 21 calendar day formation periods and seven calendar 
day holding periods (for 500 stocks). The best-performing portfolio for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2) – the investor would 





Table 11 details the best-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, after the crash on 29 September 2008. 
 
The Best-Performing Portfolios, With the Most Significant Results, After the Crash 




Case D28-D28 Case D21-D7 
Portfolio 6 Portfolio 7 
Days 121.00 Days 431.00 
Total 1025.2689% Total 1543.7762% 
Mean 8.4733% Mean 3.5818% 
Std. Error 30.5093% Std. Error 27.2814% 
t-statistic 3.055013871 t-statistic 2.725701812 
p-value 0.001386732 p-value 0.003339272 
 




Portfolio 6 Portfolio 2 
Days 121.00 Days 431.00 
Total 898.7403% Total 2256.0287% 
Mean 7.4276% Mean 5.2344% 
Std. Error 31.6810% Std. Error 41.7063% 
t-statistic 2.578950345 t-statistic 2.605580946 
p-value 0.005558822 p-value 0.004745023 
Table 11: the best-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, after the crash. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately or skipped a day before implementation, the D28-D28 combination generally yielded the most 
significant results for quantiles of 100 shares and the D21-D7 combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of 500 shares. The best-






Table 12 details the best-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, for the entire sample period.  
 
The Best-Performing Portfolios for Each of the Four Types of Reversal Portfolio, for the Entire Sample Period 




Case D-D Case D-D 
Portfolio 7 Portfolio 2 
Days 3270.00 Days 3270.00 
Total 1107.7830% Total 4489.7354% 
Mean 0.3388% Mean 1.3730% 
Std. Error 8.0736% Std. Error 25.6120% 
t-statistic 2.399456579 t-statistic 3.065508628 
p-value 0.008237535 p-value 0.001095377 
 




Portfolio 5 Portfolio 3 
Days 169.00 Days 3269.00 
Total 957.9196% Total 4137.2170% 
Mean 5.6682% Mean 1.2656% 
Std. Error 28.9280% Std. Error 22.6647% 
t-statistic 2.547227107 t-statistic 3.19264731 
p-value 0.005877845 p-value 0.000711566 
Table 12: the best-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, for the entire sample period. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately, the D-D combination exhibited the best performance for quantiles of 100 and 500 shares. If the 
investor skipped a day before implementation, the best performance was exhibited by portfolios with one calendar day formation periods and 28 calendar day 
holding periods (for 100 stocks) as well as one calendar day formation and holding periods (for 500 stocks). The best-performing portfolio for the entire sample 
period was Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2) – the investor would have gained on average approximately 1.37 US cents a day or $44.90 over the 2331 trading 





Table 13 details the best-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, for the entire sample period. 
 
The Best-Performing Portfolios, With the Most Significant Results, for the Entire Sample Period 




Case D28-D Case D-D 
Portfolio 4 Portfolio 2 
Days 3252.00 Days 3270.00 
Total 1543.7339% Total 4489.7354% 
Mean 0.4747% Mean 1.3730% 
Std. Error 8.6542% Std. Error 25.6120% 
t-statistic 3.128032824 t-statistic 3.065508628 
p-value 0.000887688 p-value 0.001095377 
 




Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3 
Days 3251.00 Days 3269.00 
Total 1546.5446% Total 4137.2170% 
Mean 0.4757% Mean 1.2656% 
Std. Error 8.6553% Std. Error 22.6647% 
t-statistic 3.133797319 t-statistic 3.19264731 
p-value 0.000870489 p-value 0.000711566 
Table 13: the best-performing portfolios, that had the most statistically significant results, for the entire sample period. 
 
If the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately or skipped a day before implementation, the D28-D28 combination generally yielded the most 
significant results for quantiles of 100 shares and the D-D combination generally yielded the most significant results for quantiles of 500 shares. The best-
performing portfolio for the entire sample period with the most significant results was Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3) – the p-value of that portfolio 




Table 14 details the best- and worst-performing portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, before the crash, after the crash and for the entire 
sample period.  
 





Entire Sample Period 
Worst Performer 
Extreme 500 Extreme 500 Extreme 500 
Case D-D7 Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Method Run Immediately Method Run Immediately Method Run Immediately 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 246.00 Days 431.00 Days 677.00 
Total -44453.4144% Total -54018.6032% Total -98472.0176% 
Mean -180.7049% Mean -125.3332% Mean -145.4535% 
Std. Error 154.0127% Std. Error 69.7328% Std. Error 111.3559% 
t-statistic -18.40268329 t-statistic -37.31366049 t-statistic -33.98640485 
p-value 2.19375E-48 p-value 3.1917E-137 p-value 1.0297E-148 
   
Best Performer 
Extreme 500 Extreme 500 Extreme 500 
Case D-D Case D-D Case D-D 
Method Skip a Day Method Run Immediately Method Run Immediately 
Portfolio 3 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 2 
Days 938.00 Days 2331.00 Days 3270.00 
Total 2646.8811% Total 3392.4604% Total 4489.7354% 
Mean 2.8218% Mean 1.4554% Mean 1.3730% 
Std. Error 21.0632% Std. Error 26.6218% Std. Error 25.6120% 
t-statistic 4.103066689 t-statistic 2.639405934 t-statistic 3.065508628 
p-value 2.21597E-05 p-value 0.004180252 p-value 0.001095377 
Table 14: the best- and worst-performing reversal portfolios before the crash, after the crash and for the entire sample period. 
 
Note that if the investor had held the best pre-crash portfolio and then held the best post-crash portfolio, he or she would have gained approximately $15.50 





Table 15 details the most under- and outperforming portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, with the most significant results, before the crash, 
after the crash and for the entire sample period.  
 






Entire Sample Period 
Worst Performer 
Extreme 500 Extreme 500 Extreme 500 
Case D-D7 Case D-D7 Case D-D7 
Method Run Immediately Method Run Immediately Method Run Immediately 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 1 
Days 246 Days 431 Days 677 
Total -44453.4144% Total -54018.6032% Total -98472.0176% 
Mean -180.7049% Mean -125.3332% Mean -145.4535% 
Std. Error 154.0127% Std. Error 69.7328% Std. Error 111.3559% 
t-statistic -18.40268329 t-statistic -37.31366049 t-statistic -33.98640485 
p-value 2.19375E-48 p-value 3.1917E-137 p-value 1.0297E-148 
   
Best Performer 
Extreme 500 Extreme 100 Extreme 500 
Case D-D Case D28-D28 Case D-D 
Method Skip a Day Method Run Immediately Method Skip a Day 
Portfolio 3 Portfolio 6 Portfolio 3 
Days 938 Days 121 Days 3269 
Total 2646.8811% Total 1025.2689% Total 4137.2170% 
Mean 2.8218% Mean 8.4733% Mean 1.2656% 
Std. Error 21.0632% Std. Error 30.5093% Std. Error 22.6647% 
t-statistic 4.103066689 t-statistic 3.055013871 t-statistic 3.19264731 
p-value 2.21597E-05 p-value 0.001386732 p-value 0.000711566 
Table 15: the most under- and outperforming portfolios for each of the four types of reversal portfolio, with the most significant results, before the crash, 
after the crash and for the entire sample period.  
 
Note that if the investor had held the most outperforming pre- and post-crash portfolios with the most significant results, he or she would have gained 
approximately $4.65 less than if he or she had only held the best portfolio for the entire sample period (approximately $41.37 vs $36.72). Note also that the 
most outperforming portfolio with the most significant results would yield approximately $19.02 less than would the combination of best-performing pre- and 




Figure 1 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing reversal 
portfolio for the entire sample period, the best-performing portfolio with the most statistically 




Figure 1: the cumulative returns to the investor from holding the best-performing reversal portfolio for 
the entire sample period, the best-performing portfolio with statistically significant returns for the entire 
sample period or the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index over the entire sample period. 
 
This comparison is made only because the investor would have had the option – among others – of 
investing in said index either directly or by means of a sort of index-tracking fund designed and 
managed in such a way as to yield a return equal to that of the S & P 500 to the investor at the end of 
the day.  
 
As can be seen, of the three options analysed above, the investor’s cumulative return would have been 
highest if he or she had held the best-performing reversal portfolio over the entire sample period than 
if he or she had held either the best-performing reversal portfolio with the most significant results or 
the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. The best-performing reversal portfolio yielded a cumulative return of 
approximately $107933.92 for every $1758.07 invested (the value of the S & P 500 Total Return Index 
as at the end of 5 January 2005, when the reversal strategy would have been first implemented). The 
best-performing reversal portfolio with the most significant results yielded a cumulative return of 
approximately $74493.24 for every $1758.07 invested. The S & P 500 grew that same initial amount to 










































































































































































































































Cumulative Returns to the Investor from Holding the Best-
Performing Combined Portfolio (in Blue), the Best-
Performing Portfolio with the Most Statistically Significant 
Returns (in Grey) or the S & P 500 (in Orange)
Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3) + Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2)
S&P 500 Total Return Index




Figures 2 to 4 are pie charts illustrating how many portfolios, of the 1000 portfolios analysed in each 
time interval, had statistically significant positive average returns, statistically insignificant positive 
average returns, statistically insignificant negative average returns and statistically significant negative 
average returns. The pie charts only take into consideration the time interval, not the investor’s 
application method or the number of component shares in the reversal portfolio. 
Each of the portfolios falls into one and only one of the following mutually exclusive categories: 
1. The portfolio’s average return is positive and statistically significant; 
2. The portfolio’s average return is positive and statistically insignificant; 
3. The portfolio’s average return is not positive and statistically insignificant; 
4. The portfolio’s average return is not positive and statistically significant. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how many portfolios fall into which category, over the entire sample period. 
 
 








Pie chart illustrating how many portfolios fall into which 
category over the entire sample period




Figure 3 illustrates how many portfolios fall into which category, over the pre-crash period. 
 
 







Pie chart illustrating how many portfolios fall 
into which category over the pre-crash period




Figure 4 illustrates how many portfolios fall into which category, over the pre-crash period. 
 
 







Pie chart illustrating how many portfolios fall 
into which category over the post-crash period




Chapter 5: Discussion of Results 
 
The objective of this investigation was to test the long-term profitability of the short-term reversal 
strategy to ascertain whether an investor who had constructed a costless long-short portfolio and 
implemented a reversal strategy would over the long-run have succeeded in accruing statistically 
significant positive cash returns from a synthetic zero position in the market. 
 
In pursuit of the above objective, 1000 long-short portfolios with zero net positions were constructed. 
25 combinations of formation and holding periods were analysed. Ten reversal portfolios were 
constructed for each case. Four different methods of assembly were used for each case. The portfolios 
were constructed in such a way as to have the absolute value of each component of each portfolio be 
equal in size. The portfolios were analysed over three periods: the period from 1 January 2005 to 29 
September 2008, the period from 29 September 2008 to 31 December 2017 and the period from 1 
January 2005 to 31 December 2017. T-tests for samples of unequal size with unequal variances were 
used for all 3000 sub-portfolios. The significance level was set at 5% for all tests – the test result will 
only be deemed to be statistically significant if the p-value is lower than 5%.  
 
In the pre-crash period, 71 portfolios had significant non-positive average returns, 91 portfolios had 
significant positive average returns, 365 portfolios had non-significant non-positive average returns and 
473 portfolios had non-significant positive average returns. 
 
The worst-performing pre-crash portfolio was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1), with a total net 
return of approximately -$444.53, an average net return of approximately -$1.81 per day and a p-value 
insignificantly different from zero to 47 decimal places. It was also the worst-performing pre-crash 
portfolio with the most significant results. The best-performing pre-crash portfolio was Extreme 500 
D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3), with a total net return of approximately $26.46, an average net return of 
approximately $0.03 per day and a p-value insignificantly different from zero to four decimal places. It 
was also the best-performing pre-crash portfolio with the most significant results. 
 
In the post-crash period, 84 portfolios had significant non-positive average returns, 92 portfolios had 
significant positive average returns, 396 portfolios had non-significant non-positive average returns and 
428 portfolios had non-significant positive average returns. 
 
The worst-performing post-crash portfolio was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1), with a total net 
return of approximately -$540.19, a net average return of approximately -$1.25 per day and a p-value 
insignificantly different from zero to 136 decimal places. It was also the worst-performing post-crash 
portfolio with the most significant results. The best-performing post-crash portfolio was Extreme 500 
D-D Run (Portfolio 2), with a total net return of approximately $33.92, an average net return of 
approximately $0.01 per day and a p-value of approximately 0.418%. The best-performing portfolio 
with the most significant results was Extreme 100 D28-D28 Run (Portfolio 6), with a total net return of 
approximately $10.25, an average net return of approximately $0.08 per day and a p-value of 
approximately 0.139%. 
 
In the entire sample period, 93 portfolios had significant non-positive average returns, 66 portfolios had 
significant positive average returns, 491 portfolios had non-significant non-positive average returns and 
350 portfolios had non-significant positive average returns.  
 
The worst-performing portfolio for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1), 
with a total net return of approximately -$984.72, a net average return of approximately -$1.45 per day 
and a p-value insignificantly different from zero to 147 decimal places. It was also the worst-performing 
portfolio for the entire sample period with the most significant results. The best-performing portfolio 
for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2), with a total net return of 
approximately $44.90, an average net return of approximately $0.01 per day and a p-value of 




significant results was Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3), with a total net return of $41.37, an 
average net return of $0.01 per day and a p-value of approximately 0.071%. 
 
If the investor had held the best-performing pre- and post-crash portfolios with the most significant 
results, he or she would have gained approximately $36.72. If he or she had held the best-performing 
portfolio for the entire sample period with the most significant results, then he or she would have gained 
approximately $41.37. If the investor had held the best-performing portfolio for the entire sample period 
(not necessarily with the most significant results), then he or she would have gained approximately 
$44.89. But if he or she had instead held the best-performing pre- and post-crash portfolios (not 
necessarily the ones with the most significant results), then he or she would have gained approximately 
$60.39.  
 
These results are of interest to investors because an investor that has committed to invest his or her 
surplus funds seeks to maximise the benefit that he or she derives therefrom, given the inherent riskiness 
of that investment. Accordingly, such an investor will invest in the available opportunity that offers the 
highest expected return and which best suits his or her risk profile (Tobin, 1958). If said investment 
performs according to expectations or surpasses said expectations, that investor will be satisfied and, in 
said state of satisfaction, will likely attribute the positive outcome to his or her own investment savvy. 
If said investment performs below expectations, then that investor will likely attribute the negative 
outcome to causes beyond his or her own choices and only then will said investor possibly be interested 
in the p-value of the investment’s performance (an example of the self-serving bias, a human tendency 
to attribute positive outcomes to one’s own character and decisions and to attribute negative outcomes 
to external factors [Boyes, 2013]). What the results above indicate is that the hypothetical investor who 
invested in Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3) between 1 January 2005 and 28 September 2008 
and in Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2) from 29 September 2008 to 31 December 2017 not only 
derived the most benefit from his or her investment (approximately $60.39) but also gained a gross 
return approximately 20.7057 times larger than that of the S & P 500 ($1 invested in the S & P 500 
grew to approximately $2.97; $1 invested in the combination of best-performing pre- and post-crash 
portfolios grew to approximately $61.39). 
 
While the worst-performing portfolios for the pre-crash period, the post-crash period and the entire 
sample period were one and the same portfolio, adjusted for running time, the best-performing 
portfolios for those time intervals differed. The difference in best-performing portfolios for the pre-
crash, post-crash and entire sample periods likely indicates a change in market behaviour between the 
pre- and post-crash periods.  
 
During the pre-crash period, there was a general sense of global prosperity. Housing valuations were 
climbing, borrowing costs were low and opportunities for profitable commercial ventures were 
plentiful. Many a market participant would have felt little need to rush into a specific trade, believing 
themselves safe in the expectation that, just as in preceding days, the overall market would always be 
rising in value. As a result, it would have been rational for an investor invested in a reversal portfolio 
to skip a day before re-balancing his or her portfolio, rather than re-balancing directly after a holding 
period ended. Given the benefits that were to be gained from the bullish global markets, it was more 
prudent to have shorter formation and holding periods, as the resultant flexibility would allow for 
maximal benefit from market participation. 
 
The post-crash period, however, was a different time. The global financial system had just suffered a 
major setback. The effects of leverage as an unbiased amplifier of both good and bad performance were 
manifested globally as individuals and entities that had made unwise financial decisions found 
themselves suffering significant losses – even ruinous losses, in some notable cases (e.g. the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, resulting in a declaration of bankruptcy on 15 September 2008 [Peacock and 
Martin, 2018]; the $182.3 million bailout the United States government handed to the American 
International Group Inc. (AIG) after AIG incurred losses on collateralised debt obligations that it had 
insured [Amadeo, 2019]; and the $7.9 billion write-off of collateralised debt obligations by Merrill 




became more bearish than before. While shorter formation and holding periods were still preferable (to 
maximise the gains offered by flexibility), it had become more prudent to execute trades earlier and 
faster than before, to minimise one’s losses and to reduce the probability of failing to successfully 
liquefy a position. It would have been rational for an investor invested in a reversal portfolio to re-
balance directly after a holding period ended, rather than skipping a day prior to implementation. 
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above results obtained in this investigation is that it was 
indeed possible for an investor who had constructed a costless long-short portfolio and implemented a 
reversal strategy to succeed over the long-run in accruing statistically significant positive cash returns 
from a synthetic zero position in the market. Depending on the time interval being considered, between 
66 and 92 reversal portfolios yielded statistically significant positive returns for their holders. A reversal 
portfolio investor who had held first the best-performing pre-crash and then the best-performing post-
crash portfolios would have gained a net return of approximately $60.39 for every $1 invested. During 
the sample period, it was possible to derive significant benefits from market activities despite effectively 
having no net position in the market at all. The possibility may yet exist today for a suitably resourced 
investor with a suitable level of risk tolerance, but in the absence of out-of-sample testing, nothing more 







Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1: Principal and Secondary Findings 
 
The principal, empirical finding of the investigation is that, while the reversal portfolio is more likely 
than not to yield average returns that are insignificantly different from zero, it is still possible in isolated 
cases to earn positive average returns from the market’s activities, despite effectively having no net 
position whatsoever in the market. 
 
The results of the investigation found that between 66 and 92 of the 1000 portfolios tested in each time 
interval yielded average returns that were positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
results of the investigation also yielded the insight that the best-performing reversal portfolio 
outperformed not only the zero portfolio but also the S & P 500 over the same period.  
 
If the investor rebalanced his or her reversal portfolio immediately after the preceding holding period 
ended, then the D-D7 combination (the shares to comprise the long and short positions are chosen based 
on the preceding one calendar day’s returns, then the resultant zero-cost long-short portfolio are held 
for the following seven calendar days) was the worst-performing combination tested before the crash, 
after the crash or over the entire sample period, for portfolios drawn from 100 or 500 shares. Over the 
entire sample period, an investor would have lost approximately $984.72. With a p-value insignificantly 
different from zero to 147 decimal places, the D-D7 portfolio’s results were also the most statistically 
significant.  
 
If the investor rebalanced his or her reversal portfolio immediately after the preceding holding period 
ended, then the D28-D combination was the combination with the most significant results for portfolios 
drawn from 100 shares, with a positive net return. It was also the best-performing portfolio for portfolios 
drawn from 100 shares: an investor would have gained approximately $15.44 and its p-value was 
approximately 0.089%. The D-D combination was both the best-performing combination for portfolios 
drawn from 500 shares and the combination with the most significant results. Its p-value was 
approximately 0.110% and an investor would have gained approximately $44.90.  
 
If the investor rebalanced his or her reversal portfolio a day after the preceding holding period ended, 
then the D14-D7 combination (the shares to comprise the long and short positions are chosen based on 
the preceding fourteen calendar days’ returns, then the resultant zero-cost long-short portfolio are held 
for the following seven calendar days) was the combination with the most significant results over the 
entire sample period, for portfolios drawn from 100 or 500 shares, with a negative net return. The p-
value of the portfolio was insignificantly different from zero to four decimal places (for portfolios drawn 
from 100 shares) and insignificantly different from zero to 49 decimal places (for portfolios drawn from 
500 shares). The worst-performing combination over the entire sample period for portfolios drawn from 
500 shares was also the D14-D7 combination (an investor would have lost approximately $321.97); for 
portfolios drawn from 100 shares, the worst-performing combination over the entire sample period was 
the D-D14 combination (an investor would have lost approximately $20.03). 
 
If the investor rebalanced his or her reversal portfolio a day after the preceding holding period ended, 
then the D28-D combination was the combination with the most significant results for portfolios drawn 
from 100 shares, with a positive net return. It was also the best-performing portfolio for portfolios drawn 
from 100 shares: an investor would have gained approximately $15.47 and its p-value was 
approximately 0.087%. The D-D combination was both the best-performing combination for portfolios 
drawn from 500 shares and the combination with the most significant results for portfolios with positive 
net returns. Its p-value was approximately 0.071% and an investor would have gained approximately 
$41.37. 
 
The worst-performing portfolio for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1), 
with a total net return of approximately -$984.72, a net average return of approximately -$1.45 per day 




portfolio for the entire sample period with the most significant results. The best-performing portfolio 
for the entire sample period was Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2), with a total net return of 
approximately $44.90, an average net return of approximately $0.01 per day and a p-value of 
approximately 0.110%. The best-performing portfolio for the entire sample period with the most 
significant results was Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3), with a total net return of approximately 
$41.37, an average net return of $0.01 per day and a p-value of approximately 0.071%. 
 
If the investor had held the best-performing pre- and post-crash portfolios with the most significant 
results, he or she would have gained approximately $36.72. If he or she had held the best-performing 
portfolio for the entire sample period with the most significant results, then he or she would have gained 
approximately $41.37. If the investor had held the best-performing portfolio for the entire sample period 
(not necessarily with the most significant results), then he or she would have gained approximately 
$44.89. But if he or she had instead held the best-performing pre- and post-crash portfolios (not 
necessarily the ones with the most significant results), then he or she would have gained approximately 
$60.39.  
 
The secondary finding of the investigation is that, as was discovered by earlier authors, there appears 
to be sufficient evidence to disprove Fama’s (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
 
While few of the costless portfolios tested yielded statistically significant positive average returns, the 
fact that some of the costless portfolios did yield statistically significant positive average returns implies 
that the possibility of gaining reward from effectively having a zero position in the market does exist. 
The success of some of the costless portfolios also implies that it is possible to use public information 
to construct a portfolio that outperforms the market, thus disproving the argument to the contrary that 






6.2: Limitations of the Investigation 
 




The findings of this investigation say nothing about whether the observed profitability of the reversal 
strategy endures once transaction costs are taken into consideration. While one may infer from the 
results of the analyses the level at which transaction costs would have to be set to eliminate profits 




It is assumed that the long and short positions are collectively of equal absolute value (i.e. their distances 
from zero on the real number line are equal [Varsity Tutors, 2007]) and that the absolute values of the 
long and short positions are all equal. But said assumptions may not always hold.  
 
In the composition of each reversal portfolio, the number of units of each share to be bought or sold 
must be an integer (shares are only traded in integer quantities). Accordingly, said quantities are the 
solutions of the following linear polynomial equation: 𝐿1𝑃1 + 𝐿2𝑃2 + ⋯ + 𝐿𝑋−1𝑃𝑋−1 + 𝐿𝑋𝑃𝑋 −
(𝑆1𝑄1 + 𝑆2𝑄2 + ⋯ + 𝑆𝑋−1𝑄𝑋−1 + 𝑆𝑋𝑄𝑋) = 0 , where the indexed L’s are the quantities of shares to be 
purchased for the long positions, the indexed S’s are the quantities of shares to be sold for the short 
positions, the indexed P’s are the prices of the shares in the long positions, the indexed Q’s are the 
prices of the short positions and X equals either five (for reversal portfolios from 100 shares) or 25 (for 
reversal portfolios from 500 shares).  
 
The indexed L’s and S’s must be whole numbers because shares are not traded in fractional quantities. 
Accordingly, the above linear polynomial equation admits only integer solutions and is therefore 
Diophantine (Weisstein, 2019). If the above Diophantine equation is unsolvable using Diophantine 
methods (i.e. if there exists no set of integers such that the equation is entirely satisfied), then it will be 
impossible for the investor to construct the necessary zero-investment portfolio for the reversal strategy. 
Even if the above Diophantine equation is solvable, the prices will almost certainly differ and it is 
almost certain that the absolute values of the weighted components will differ, which will mean that the 




In practice, there will be statutory restrictions on the degree to which one can execute short sales in the 
market, which will curtail the investor’s flexibility and, hence, restrict the effectiveness of the reversal 




There will also be a borrowing cost involved, which is not considered in this investigation. Short selling 
is by definition the sale of securities that one does not own. Therefore, said securities must be borrowed 
from their actual owners, who will charge a borrowing fee equal to some proportion of the value of the 
securities in addition to requiring the setup of a margin account (to hold some of the proceeds and mark 
the position to market) and requiring that the short seller make good on any cash incomes that would 
ordinarily have come to the owner of the shares had said owner been holding the shares as per normal. 




The buying and selling of shares are subject to diminishing marginal returns. As one purchases more 




market at a given price for purchase, after which one moves to satisfy more expensive offers. As one 
sells more and more shares, the selling price decreases for much the same reason. The diminishing 
marginal returns in both cases will eat into the cash returns from the reversal portfolio and may serve 




Shares on the market are bought and sold in blocks of sizes chosen by the relevant market participants 
as per their individual needs. It may not always be possible to purchase or sell precisely the number of 







6.3: Suggestions for Further Research 
 
It is suggested that future research include some means of including average trading and borrowing 
costs in the analysis. It is also suggested that future research consider statutory restrictions on short 
selling that may apply in a given financial market. Finally, it is suggested that future research have an 
expanded scope to include out-of-sample testing of the profitability of the return reversal strategy as 
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Appendix 1: The sources of the sample data for this investigation 
 
The following 780 companies’ ordinary shares were included in the S & P 500 index between 3 January 
2005 and 29 December 2017. 
 
1. 21st Century Fox Inc 
2. 3M Co 
3. A.O. Smith Corp 
4. Abbott Laboratories 
5. AbbVie Ltd 
6. Abercrombie & Fitch 
7. Accenture PLC 
8. Activision Blizzard Inc 
9. Acuity Brands Inc 
10. ADC Telecommunications  
11. Adobe Systems Inc 
12. ADT 
13. Adtalem Global Education Inc 
14. Advance Auto Parts Inc 
15. Advanced Micro Devices Inc 
16. AES Corp 
17. Aetna Inc 
18. Affiliated Computer Services 
19. Affiliated Managers Group Inc 
20. Aflac Inc 
21. Agilent Technologies Inc 
22. AIG Inc 
23. Air Products and Chemicals Inc 
24. Airgas Inc 
25. AK Steel Holding Corp 
26. Alaska Air Group Inc 
27. Albemarle Corp 
28. Alberto Culver Co 
29. Alcoa Corp 
30. Alexandria Real Estate Equities Inc 
31. Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc 
32. Align Technology Inc 
33. Allegheny Technologies Inc 
34. Allegion PLC 
35. Allergan plc 
36. Alliance Data Systems Corp 
37. Alliant Energy Corp 
38. Allied Waste Industries LLC 
39. Allstate Corp 
40. Alpha Natural Resources 
41. Alphabet Inc 
42. Altaba Inc 
43. Altria Group Inc 
44. Amazon.com Inc 
45. Ambac Financial Group Inc 
46. Ameren Corp 
47. American Airlines Group Inc 
48. American Capital 
49. American Electric Power Company Inc 
50. American Express Co 
51. American Power 
52. American Tower Corp 
53. Ameriprise Financial Inc 
54. AmerisourceBergen Corp 
55. Ametek Inc 
56. Amgen Inc 
57. Amphenol Corp 
58. AmSouth Bancorp 
59. Anadarko Petroleum Corp 
60. Analog Devices Inc 
61. Andeavor Logistics LP 
62. Andrew Corp 
63. Anheuser-Busch Companies 
64. ANSYS Inc 
65. Anthem Inc 
66. Anthem Inc 
67. AON PLC 
68. Apache Corp 
69. Apartment Investment & Management Co 
70. Apollo Education Group 
71. Apple Inc 
72. Applied Materials Inc 
73. Applied Micro Circuits 
74. Aptiv PLC 
75. Archer Daniels Midland Co 
76. Archstone-Smith Trust 
77. Arconic Inc 
78. Arthur J Gallagher & Co 
79. Ashland Global Holdings Inc 
80. Assurant Inc 
81. AT&T Inc 
82. Autodesk Inc 
83. Automatic Data Processing Inc 
84. AutoNation Inc 
85. Autozone Inc 
86. AvalonBay Communities Inc 
87. Avaya 
88. Avery Dennison Corp 
89. Avis Budget Corp 
90. Avon Products Inc 
91. Baker Hughes GE 
92. Ball Corp 
93. Bank of America Corp 
94. Bank of New York Mellon Corp 
95. Barr Pharmaceuticals 





98. Baxter International 
99. BB&T Corp 
100. Beam 
101. Bear Stearns 
102. Becton Dickinson & Co 
103. Bed Bath & Beyond Inc 
104. Bemis Company Inc 
105. Berkshire Hathaway Inc 
106. Best Buy Co Inc 
107. Big Lots Inc 
108. Biogen Inc 
109. BJ Services 
110. BlackRock Inc 
111. BMC Software 
112. Boeing Co 
113. Booking Holdings Inc 
114. BorgWarner Inc 
115. Boston Properties Inc 
116. Boston Scientific Corp 
117. Brighthouse Financial Inc 
118. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co 
119. Broadcom Corp 
120. Broadcom Inc 
121. Brown-Forman Corp 
122. Brunswick Corp 
123. Burlington Rescue 
124. C R Bard 
125. C.H. Robinson Worldwide 
126. CA Inc 
127. Cablevision Systems Corp 
128. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp 
129. Cadence Design Systems Corp 
130. Caesars Entertainment Corp 
131. Calpine 
132. Cameron International  
133. Campbell Soup Co 
134. Capital One Financial Corp 
135. Cardinal Health Inc 
136. CareFusion 
137. Caremark Rx Inc 
138. CarMax 
139. Carnival Corp 
140. Caterpillar Inc 
141. CBOE Global Markets Inc 
142. CBRE Group 
143. CBS Corp 
144. Celgene Corp 
145. Centene Corp 
146. CenterPoint Energy Inc 
147. Centex Corp 
148. CenturyLink   
149. Cephalon 
150. Cerner Corp 
151. CF Industries Holdings 
152. Charles Schwab Corp 
153. Charter Communications Inc 
154. Chesapeake Energy Corp 
155. Chevron Corp 
156. Chipotle Mexican Grill 
157. Chiron Corp 
158. Chubb Corp 
159. Chubb Ltd 
160. Church & Dwight Co Inc 
161. Cimarex Energy Co 
162. Cincinnati Financial Corp 
163. Cinergy 
164. Cintas Corp 
165. Circuit City Stores 
166. Cisco Systems Inc 
167. CIT Group Inc 
168. Citigroup Inc 
169. Citizens Financial Group Inc 
170. Citrix Systems Inc 
171. Clear Channel Communications 
172. Cleveland-Cliffs Inc 
173. Clorox Co 
174. CME Group Inc 
175. CMS Energy Corp 
176. CNO Financial Group Inc 
177. CNX Resources Corp 
178. Coca-Cola Co 
179. Coca-Cola European Partners PLC 
180. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp 
181. Colgate-Palmolive Co 
182. Columbia Pipeline Group 
183. Comcast Corp 
184. Comerica Inc 
185. Compass Bancshare 
186. Compuware 
187. Comverse Technology 
188. Conagra Brands Inc 
189. Concho Resources Inc 
190. Conexant Systems 
191. ConocoPhillips 
192. Consolidated Edison Inc 
193. Constellation Brands Inc 
194. Convergys 
195. Cooper Companies Inc 
196. Cooper Industries 
197. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co 
198. Corning Inc 
199. Costco Wholesale Corp 
200. Coty Inc 
201. Crane Co 
202. Crown Castle International Corp 
203. CSRA  
204. CSX Corp 
205. Cummins Inc 




207. D. R. Horton Inc 
208. Dana Inc 
209. Danaher Corp 
210. Darden Restaurants Inc 
211. DaVita Inc 
212. DDR Corp 
213. Dean Foods Co 
214. Deere and Co 
215. Dell 
216. Delphi Corp 
217. Delta Air Lines Inc 
218. Deluxe Corp 
219. Denbury Resources Inc 
220. Dentsply Sirona Inc 
221. Devon Energy Corp 
222. Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc 
223. Digital Realty Trust Inc 
224. Dillard's Inc 
225. Discover Financial Services 
226. Discovery Inc 
227. DISH Network Corp 
228. Dollar General Corp 
229. Dollar Tree Inc 
230. Dominion Energy Inc 
231. Dover Corp 
232. Dow Chemical 
233. Dow Jones 
234. DowDuPont Inc 
235. DTE Energy Co 
236. Duke Energy Corp 
237. Duke Realty Corp 
238. Dun & Bradstreet Corp 
239. DXC Technology Co 
240. Dynegy 
241. E I du Pont de Nemours & Co 
242. E*TRADE Financial Corp 
243. E. W. Scripps Co 
244. Eastman Chemical Co 
245. Eastman Kodak Co 
246. Eaton Corporation PLC 
247. eBay Inc 
248. Ecolab Inc 
249. Edison International 
250. Edwards Lifesciences Corp 
251. El Paso Electric Co 
252. Electronic Arts Inc 
253. Electronic Data Systems 
254. Eli Lilly and Co 
255. Embarq Corporation 
256. EMC 
257. Emerson Electric Co 
258. Encompass Health Corp 
259. Endo International PLC 
260. Ensco PLC 
261. Entergy Corp 
262. Enterprise Products Partners LP 
263. Envision Healthcare Corp 
264. EOG Resources Inc 
265. EQT Corp 
266. Equinix Inc 
267. Equity Office 
268. Equity Residential 
269. Essex Property Trust Inc 
270. Estee Lauder Companies Inc 
271. Everest Re Group Inc 
272. Eversource Energy 
273. Exelon Corp 
274. Expeditors International of Washington Inc 
275. Express Scripts Holding Co 
276. Extra Space Storage Inc 
277. Exxon Mobil Corp 
278. F5 Networks Inc 
279. Facebook Inc 
280. Family Dollar Stores 
281. Fastenal Co 
282. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp 
283. Federal National Mortgage Association 
284. Federal Realty Investment Trust 
285. Federated Investors Inc 
286. FedEx Corp 
287. Fidelity National Information Services Inc 
288. Fifth Third Bancorp 
289. First Data Corp 
290. First Horizon National Corp 
291. First Solar Inc 
292. FirstEnergy Corp 
293. Fiserv Inc 
294. FLIR Systems Inc 
295. Flowserve Corp 
296. Fluor Corp 
297. FMC Corp 
298. Foot Locker Inc 
299. Ford Motor Co 
300. Forest Laboratories 
301. Fortive Corp 
302. Fortune Brands Home & Security Inc 
303. Fossil Group Inc 
304. Franklin Resources Inc 
305. Freeport-McMoRan Inc 
306. Freescale Semiconductors 
307. Frontier Communications Corp 
308. GameStop Corp 
309. Gap Inc 
310. Garmin Ltd 
311. Gartner Inc 
312. Gateway 
313. General Dynamics Corp 
314. General Electric Co 
315. General Mills Inc 




317. Genuine Parts Co 
318. Genworth Financial Inc 
319. Genzyme 
320. Georgia-Pacific 
321. Gilead Sciences Inc 
322. Gillette 
323. Global Payments Inc 
324. Golden West Finance 
325. Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
326. Goodrich Petroleum Corp 
327. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co 
328. Graham Holdings Co 
329. Great Lakes Chemicals 
330. Guidant 
331. H & R Block Inc 
332. Halliburton Co 
333. HanesBrands Inc 
334. Harley-Davidson Inc 
335. Harman International 
336. Harris Corp 
337. Hartford Financial Services Group Inc 
338. Hasbro Inc 
339. HCA Healthcare Inc 
340. HCP Inc 
341. Health Management Associates 
342. Helmerich and Payne Inc 
343. Henry Schein Inc 
344. Hercules 
345. Hershey Co 
346. Hess Corp 
347. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co 
348. Hillshire Brands 
349. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc 
350. HJ Heinz 
351. Hologic Inc 
352. Home Depot Inc 
353. Honeywell International Inc 
354. Hormel Foods Corp 
355. Hospira 
356. Host Hotels & Resorts Inc 
357. HP Inc 
358. Hudson City Bancorp 
359. Humana Inc 
360. Huntington Bancshares Inc 
361. IBM Corp 
362. IDEXX Laboratories Inc 
363. IHS Markit Ltd 
364. Illinois Tool Works Inc 
365. Illumina Inc 
366. Incyte Corp 
367. Ingersoll-Rand PLC 
368. Integrys Energy Group 
369. Intel Corp 
370. InterActiveCorp 
371. Intercontinental Exchange Inc 
372. International Flavors & Fragrances Inc 
373. International Game Technology PLC 
374. International Paper Co 
375. Interpublic Group of Companies Inc 
376. Intuit Inc 
377. Intuitive Surgical Inc 
378. Invesco Ltd 
379. IQVIA Holdings Inc 
380. Iron Mountain Inc 
381. ITT Inc 
382. J B Hunt Transport Services Inc 
383. J C Penney Company Inc 
384. J M Smucker Co 
385. Jabil Inc 
386. Jacobs Engineering Group Inc 
387. Janus Capital Group 
388. Jefferies Financial Group Inc 
389. Jefferson Pilot 
390. Johnson & Johnson 
391. Johnson Controls International PLC 
392. Jones Group 
393. Joy Global 
394. JP Morgan Chase & CO 
395. Juniper Networks Inc 
396. Kansas City Southern 
397. Kate Spade and Co 
398. KB Home 
399. Kellogg Co 
400. Kerr-McGee 
401. Keurig Dr Pepper Inc 
402. Keurig Green Mountain 
403. KeyCorp 
404. Keyspan Corp 
405. Kimberly-Clark Corp 
406. Kimco Realty Corp 
407. Kinder Morgan Inc 
408. KLA-Tencor Corp 
409. Knight Ridder 
410. Kohls Corp 
411. Kroger Co 
412. L Brands Inc 
413. L3 Technologies Inc 
414. Laboratory Corporation of America 
Holdings 
415. Lam Research Corp 
416. Las Vegas Sands Corp 
417. Legg Mason Inc 
418. Leggett & Platt Inc 
419. Lehman Brothers Holdings 
420. Leidos Holdings Inc 
421. Lennar Corp 
422. Level 3 Communications 
423. Lexmark International 
424. Life Technologies 




426. Linear Technology 
427. LKQ Corp 
428. Lockheed Martin Corp 
429. Loews Corp 
430. Lorillard Inc 
431. Louisiana-Pacific Corp 
432. Lowe's Companies Inc 
433. LSI 
434. Lucent Technology 
435. LyondellBasell Industries NV 
436. M&T Bank Corp 
437. Macerich Co 
438. Macy's Inc 
439. Mallinckrodt PLC 
440. Manitowoc Company Inc 
441. Manor Care 
442. Marathon Oil Corp 
443. Marathon Petroleum Corp 
444. Marriott International Inc 
445. Marsh & McLennan Companies Inc 
446. Martin Marietta Materials Inc 
447. Masco Corp 
448. Massey Energy 
449. Mastercard Inc 
450. Mattel Inc 
451. Maxim Integrated Products Inc 
452. MBIA Inc 
453. MBNA Corp 
454. McCormick and Company Inc 
455. McDermott International Inc 
456. McDonald's Corp 
457. McKesson Corp 
458. Mead Johnson Nutrition 
459. Meadwestvaco 
460. Medco Health Solutions 
461. Medimmune  
462. Medtronic PLC 
463. Mellon Financial  
464. Merck & Co Inc 
465. Mercury Interactive 
466. Meredith Corp 
467. MetLife Inc 
468. Mettler-Toledo International Inc 
469. MGIC Investment Corp 
470. MGM Resorts International 
471. Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 
472. Microchip Technology Inc 
473. Micron Technology Inc 
474. Microsoft Corp 
475. Mid-America Apartment Communities Inc 
476. Millipore Corp 
477. Mohawk Industries Inc 
478. Molex 
479. Molson Coors Brewing Co 
480. Mondelez International Inc 
481. Monsanto 
482. Monster Beverage Corp 
483. Monster Worldwide 
484. Moody's Corp 
485. Morgan Stanley 
486. Mosaic Co 
487. Motorola Mobility Holdings 
488. Motorola Solutions Inc 
489. Motors Liquidation Co 
490. Murphy Oil Corp 
491. Mylan NV 
492. Nabors Industries Ltd 
493. Nasdaq Inc 
494. National City 
495. National Oilwell Varco Inc 
496. National Semiconductor 
497. Navient Corp 
498. Navistar International Corp 
499. NCR Corp 
500. NetApp Inc 
501. Netflix Inc 
502. New York Times Co 
503. Newell Brands Inc 
504. Newfield Exploration Co 
505. Newmont Mining Corp 
506. News Corp 
507. Nextel Comms 
508. Nextera Energy Inc 
509. Nielsen Holdings PLC 
510. Nike Inc 
511. NiSource Inc 
512. Noble Corporation PLC 
513. Noble Energy Inc 
514. Nordstrom Inc 
515. Norfolk Southern Corp 
516. Nortel Networks 
517. North Fork Bancorp 
518. Northern Trust Corp 
519. Northrop Grumman Corp 
520. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd 
521. Novell 
522. Novellus System 
523. NRG Energy Inc 
524. Nucor Corp 
525. NVIDIA Corp 
526. NYSE Euronext 
527. Occidental Petroleum Corp 
528. Office Depot Inc 
529. OfficeMax 
530. Omnicom Group Inc 
531. ONEOK Inc 
532. Oracle Corp 
533. O'Reilly Automotive Inc 
534. Owens-Illinois Inc 




536. Packaging Corp of America 
537. Pactiv 
538. Pall Inc 
539. Palm Inc 
540. Park Hotels & Resorts Inc 
541. Parker-Hannifin Corp 
542. Patterson Companies Inc 
543. Paychex Inc 
544. PayPal Holdings Inc 
545. Peabody Energy Corp 
546. Pentair PLC 
547. Peoples Energy 
548. People's United Financial Inc 
549. Pepsi Bottling Corporation 
550. PepsiCo Inc 
551. PerkinElmer Inc 
552. Perrigo Company PLC 
553. PetSmart 
554. Pfizer Inc 
555. PG&E Corp 
556. Philip Morris International Inc 
557. Phillips 66 
558. Pinnacle West Capital Corp 
559. Pioneer Natural Resources Co 
560. Pitney Bowes Inc 
561. Plum Creek Timber Company 
562. PMC Sierra 
563. PNC Financial Services Group Inc 
564. Power One 
565. PPG Industries Inc 
566. PPL Corp 
567. Praxair Inc 
568. Precision Castparts 
569. Principal Financial Group Inc 
570. Procter & Gamble Co 
571. Progress Energy 
572. Progressive Corp 
573. Prologis Inc 
574. Providian Financial 
575. Prudential Financial 
576. PTC Inc 
577. Public Service Enterprise Group Inc 
578. Public Storage 
579. PulteGroup Inc 
580. PVH Corp 
581. QEP Resources Inc 
582. QLogic  
583. Qorvo Inc 
584. Qualcomm Inc 
585. Quanta Services Inc 
586. Quest Diagnostics Inc 
587. Questar 
588. Qwest Communications International 
589. Ralph Lauren Corp 
590. Range Resources Corp 
591. Raymond James Financial Inc 
592. Raytheon Co 
593. Realogy Holdings Corp 
594. Realty Income Corp 
595. Red Hat Inc 
596. Reebok International 
597. Regency Centers Corp 
598. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc 
599. Regions Financial Corp 
600. Republic Services Inc 
601. Resmed Inc 
602. Reynolds American 
603. Robert Half International Inc 
604. Rockwell Automation Inc 
605. Rockwell Collins Inc 
606. Rohm & Haas 
607. Roper Technologies Inc 
608. Ross Stores Inc 
609. Rowan Companies PLC 
610. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd 
611. RR Donnelley & Sons Co 
612. RS Legacy 
613. Ryder System Inc 
614. S&P Global Inc 
615. Sabre Corp 
616. Sabre Holdings 
617. Safeco 
618. Safeway 
619. Salesforce.com Inc 
620. SanDisk 
621. Sanmina Corp 
622. Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc 
623. Sapient 
624. SBA Communications Corp 
625. SCANA Corp 
626. Schlumberger NV 
627. Scientific Atlanta 
628. Scripps Network Interactive 
629. Seagate Technology PLC 
630. Sealed Air Corp 
631. Sears Holdings Corp 
632. Sempra Energy 
633. Sherwin-Williams Co 
634. Siebel Systems 
635. Sigma Aldrich 
636. Signet Jewellers Ltd 
637. Simon Property Group Inc 
638. Skyworks Solutions Inc 
639. SL Green Realty Corp 
640. SLM Corp 
641. Smith International 
642. Snap-On Inc 
643. Solectron Corp 
644. Southern Co 




646. Southwestern Energy Co 
647. Spectra Energy 
648. Spectra Energy Partners LP 
649. Sprint Corp 
650. Sprint Nextel  
651. St Jude Medical 
652. Stanley Black & Decker Inc 
653. Staples 
654. Starbucks Corp 
655. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide 
656. State Street Corp 
657. Stericycle Inc 
658. Stryker Corp 
659. Sun Microsystems 
660. SunEdison 
661. SunGard Data 
662. Sunoco 
663. SunTrust Banks Inc 
664. Supervalu Inc 
665. Symantec Corp 
666. Symbol Technologies 
667. Synchrony Financial 
668. Synovus Financial Corp 
669. Sysco Corp 
670. T. Rowe Price Group Inc 
671. Tapestry Inc 
672. Target Corp 
673. TE Connectivity Ltd 
674. TechnipFMC PLC 
675. Teco Energy 
676. Tegna Inc 
677. Tektronix 
678. Tellabs 
679. Temple Inland 
680. Tenet Healthcare Corp 
681. Teradata Corp 
682. Teradyne Inc 
683. Terex Corp 
684. Tesla Inc 
685. Texas Instruments Inc 
686. Textron Inc 
687. Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc 
688. Thomas and Betts 
689. Tiffany and Co 
690. Time Warner 
691. Time Warner Cable 
692. Titanium Metals 
693. TJX Companies Inc 
694. T-Mobile US Inc 
695. Torchmark Corp 
696. Total System Services Inc 
697. Tractor Supply Co 
698. Trane 
699. TransDigm Group Inc 
700. Transocean Ltd 
701. Travelers Companies Inc 
702. Tribune Media Co 
703. TripAdvisor Inc 
704. Tupperware Brands Corp 
705. TXU 
706. Tyson Foods Inc 
707. U.S. Bancorp 
708. UDR Inc 
709. Ulta Beauty Inc 
710. Under Armour Inc 
711. Union Pacific Corp 
712. Unisys Corp 
713. United Continental Holdings Inc 
714. United Rentals Inc 
715. United States Steel Corp 
716. United Technologies Corp 
717. UnitedHealth Group Inc 
718. Universal Health Services Inc 
719. Univision 
720. Unocal Corp 
721. Unum Group 
722. UPS Inc 
723. Urban Outfitters Inc 
724. US Airways Group 
725. UST 
726. Varian Medical Systems Inc 
727. Ventas Inc 
728. Verisign Inc 
729. Verisk Analytics Inc 
730. Veritas Software 
731. Verizon Communications Inc 
732. Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc 
733. VF Corp 
734. Viacom Inc 
735. Viavi Solutions Inc 
736. Visa Inc 
737. Visteon Corp 
738. Vitesse Semiconductor 
739. Vornado Realty Trust 
740. Vulcan Materials Co 
741. W W Grainger Inc 
742. Wachovia Corp 
743. Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc 
744. Walmart Inc 
745. Walt Disney Co 
746. Washington Mutual 
747. Waste Management Inc 
748. Waters Corp 
749. Weatherford International PLC 
750. WEC Energy Group Inc 
751. Wells Fargo and Co 
752. Welltower Inc 
753. Wendy's CO 
754. Wendy's International 




756. Western Union Co 
757. WestRock Co 
758. Weyerhaeuser Co 
759. Whirlpool Co 
760. Whole Foods Market Co 
761. Williams Companies Inc 
762. Willis Towers Watson PLC 
763. Windstream Holdings Inc 
764. Winn Dixie Stores 
765. WM Wrigley Jr 
766. Worthington Industries Inc 
767. WPX Energy Inc 
768. Wyeth 
769. Wyndham Destinations Inc 
770. Wynn Resorts Ltd 
771. Xcel Energy Inc 
772. Xerox Corp 
773. Xilinx Inc 
774. XL Group 
775. XTO Energy 
776. Xylem Inc 
777. Yum! Brands Inc 
778. Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc 
779. Zions Bancorp 





Appendix 2: The Key for the Tables in Chapter 4 and the Figures in Appendix 3 
 
The key for the tables and the figures is as follows. 
 
“Extreme” indicates that the portfolio in question was constructed using the extreme quantiles method. 
 
“100” or “500” indicates that the portfolio was constructed as a quantile of 100 or 500 shares, 
respectively. 
 
“Run Immediately” or “Run” indicates that the investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately 
after the designated formation period closed. 
 
“Skip a Day” or “Run Skip” indicates that the investor waited a day after the designated formation 
period closed before implementing the reversal strategy. 
 
“Portfolio k” indicates that the portfolio was constructed using Quantile k, which consisted of equally 
weighted long positions in the twentieth of the shares in the sub-sample at position 21-k and equally 
weighted short positions in the twentieth of the shares at position k. 
 
The shorthand notation for naming the 25 cases analysed gives the formation period first, followed by 
the holding period, joined by a hyphen.  
 
“D” indicates a period of one calendar day. 
 
“D7” indicates a period of seven calendar days. 
 
“D14” indicates a period of fourteen calendar days. 
 
“D21” indicates a period of twenty-one calendar days. 
 
“D28” indicates a period of twenty-eight calendar days.  
 
 
For example, “D14-D21” indicates that the formation period for the portfolio was fourteen calendar 





Appendix 3: Charts Illustrating the Results of this Investigation 
 
Figures 5 to 11 are charts illustrating the cumulative returns that the investor would have realised for 
each $1 invested under any of the circumstances outlined. Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the cumulative returns 
to the investor from holding the worst-performing portfolios. Figures 8 to 10 illustrate the cumulative 
returns to the investor from holding the best-performing portfolios. Figure 11 illustrates the difference 
in cumulative returns depending on whether the investor held the best-performing portfolio for the entire 
sample period without interruptions or the investor held first the best-performing pre-crash portfolio, 
followed by a switch to the best-performing post-crash portfolio. 
 
The key for the charts below is as given in Appendix 2. 




Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the worst-performing pre-crash 
portfolio. “Extreme 500 D-D7 Run (Portfolio 1)” means the following. The extreme twentieths method 
was used to construct the portfolio, using a sub-sample of 500 shares. The formation period was one 
calendar day, the holding period was seven calendar days. The investor implemented the reversal 
strategy immediately after the formation period closed and the portfolio in question consisted of long 
positions in shares 476-500 balanced against short positions in shares 1-25, as ranked based upon 
performance in the formation period. 
 
 
Figure 5: the cumulative return to the investor from holding the worst-performing pre-crash portfolio 
from 4 January 2005 to 26 September 2008. 
 
As can be seen, the investor would have lost money almost immediately after implementing the reversal 
strategy and would have continued to lose money over time, until finally realising a negative cumulative 

















































































































































































































Cumulative Return to the Investor from Holding the Worst-
Performing Pre-Crash Portfolio from 4 January 2005 to 26 
September 2008




Figure 6 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from the worst-performing post-crash portfolio.  
 
 
Figure 6: the cumulative return to the investor from holding the worst-performing post-crash portfolio 
from 29 September 2008 to 29 December 2017. 
 
As can be seen, the investor would have incurred cash losses almost immediately after implementing 
the reversal strategy and said losses would have increased over time, culminating in a negative 


























Cumulative Return to the Investor from Holding the Worst 
Performing Post-Crash Portfolio from 29 September 2008 
Onwards




Figure 7 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the worst-performing portfolio 
for the entire sample period. 
 
 
Figure 7: the cumulative return to the investor from holding the worst-performing portfolio from 4 
January 2005 to 29 December 2017. 
 
As can be seen, the investor would have incurred cash losses almost immediately after first 
implementing the strategy and said losses would only have increased with time, rising to a negative 

























Cumulative Return to the Investor from Holding the Worst-
Perfroming Portfolio for the Entire Sample Period




Figure 8 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing pre-crash 
portfolio. “Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3)” means the following. The extreme twentieths 
method was used to construct the portfolio, using a sub-sample of 500 shares. The formation and 
holding periods were both one calendar day. The investor implemented the reversal strategy a day after 
the formation period closed and the portfolio in question consisted of long positions in shares 426-450 




Figure 8: the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing pre-crash portfolio 
from 5 January 2005 to 26 September 2008. 
 
As can be seen, the investor would have made cash gains almost immediately after implementing the 
reversal strategy and would generally have continued to do so in each period thereafter, culminating in 

















































































































































































































Cumulative Return to the Investor from Holding the Best-
Performing Pre-Crash Portfolio from 5 January 2005 to 26 
September 2008




Figure 9 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing post-crash 
portfolio. “Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2)” means the following. The extreme quantiles method 
was used to construct the portfolio, using a sub-sample of 500 shares. The formation and holding periods 
were both one calendar day. The investor implemented the reversal strategy immediately after the 
formation period closed and the portfolio in question consisted of long positions in shares 451-475 




Figure 9: the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing post-crash portfolio, 
from 29 September 2008 to 29 December 2017. 
 
As can be seen, the investor would have made cash gains almost immediately after implementing the 
reversal strategy and would generally have continued to do so in each period thereafter, culminating in 




























Cumulative Return to the Investor from Holding the Best 
Performing Post-Crash Portfolio from 29 September 2008 to 
29 December 2017




Figure 10 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing portfolio 
for the entire sample period.  
 
 
Figure 10: the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing portfolio from 4 
January 2005 to 29 December 2017. 
 
The performance of the portfolio was slow but positive in the first two years, but a patient investor 
would have seen a subsequent rally followed by a more gradual and relatively constant growth, 


























Cumulative Return to the Investor from Holding the Best-
Performing Portfolio for the Entire Sample Period




Figure 11 illustrates the cumulative return to the investor from holding the best-performing portfolio 
for the entire sample period as opposed to holding the best-performing pre- and post-crash portfolios.  
 
 
Figure 11: a side-by-side comparison of the cumulative returns to the investor from holding either the 
best-performing portfolio for the entire sample period or the best-performing pre- and post-crash 
portfolios. 
 
As can be seen, the investor’s cumulative return would have been higher if he or she had held the best-
performing pre- and post-crash portfolios, than if he or she had only held the best-performing portfolio 
for the entire sample period. The orange option yields a total cumulative return of approximately $45.90 


































Cumulative Returns to the Investor from Holding Either the 
Best-Performing Portfolio for the Entire Sample Period (in 
Orange) or the Best-Performing Pre-Crash Portfolio followed 
by the Best-Performing Post-Crash Portfolio (in Blue)
Extreme 500 D-D Run Skip (Portfolio 3) + Extreme 500 D-D Run (Portfolio 2)




Appendix 4: Tables of portfolios with positive average returns and significant average returns, over the 
three time periods considered 
 
The following tables indicate which reversal portfolios had positive average returns and which reversal 
portfolios had significant average returns, for every case considered in each of the time periods of 
interest. 
 
The key for reading the tables, which is also in Appendix 2, is as follows. 
 
A specific case is to be identified first by its formation period, then by its holding period. To that end, 
one must first scroll horizontally to find the appropriate formation period, then vertically to find the 
appropriate holding period for that case. 
 
The numbers in the cells indicate the reversal portfolios in that case, for that grouping, that met the 
criterion of the table in question over the time period of interest. An empty cell indicates that no portfolio 
satisfied the criterion of the table in that case, for that grouping. 
 
The shorthand notation for naming the 25 cases analysed gives the formation period first, followed by 
the holding period, joined by a hyphen.  
 
“D” indicates a period of one calendar day. 
 
“D7” indicates a period of seven calendar days. 
 
“D14” indicates a period of fourteen calendar days. 
 
“D21” indicates a period of twenty-one calendar days. 
 
“D28” indicates a period of twenty-eight calendar days.  
 
 
For example, “D-D7” indicates that the formation period for the portfolio was one calendar day and that 






The following six tables relate to portfolios constructed as quantiles of 100 shares, where the investor 
implemented the reversal strategy immediately. 
 
Table 16 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the entire sample 
period. Table 17 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the entire 
sample period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 













D7  6 3,5,10 5,6,9,10 4,6,8,9 




2,5,7,8,9,10 4,5,7,8,9 3,4,8,9,10 
D28 5,9 2,3,5,7,9,10 7,8,9 1,4,6,7,8,9,10 1,4,6,7,8,9 
Table 16: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 1,7,10 4 4 4 4 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 4 1,6,9 1,6 1,2 
D14   1,2,3,4,5,7,10 1,3 1,2,5 2 
D21 3     2 4 
D28 3,4 5     6 
Table 17: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Table 18 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the pre-crash period. 
Table 19 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the pre-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,3,4,6,7,9,10 1,3,4,5,6,10 1,3,4,5,7,8,9,10 3,4,5,6,7,9 3,4,5,6,7,8,10 
D7   2,4,5 3,5,8,10 5,6,9,10 4,6,8,9 
D14     8 9 6,8,9 
D21 1,2,3,7 4,6 5,9 4,8,9 4,7 
D28 2 2,4,5,6,7,8,9 4,5 9,10 1,7,8 







Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 1,6,7 5   4 4,7 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 9 1 1,6,8 1 
D14 1,2,3,4,6,8,9 4,7,9,10 1,2,3 1 1 
D21 3,6   3,4 3,10   
D28 1,6   1 3 3,10 
Table 19: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period. 
 
Table 20 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the post-crash period. 
Table 21 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the post-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 












D7     2,3,4,5 4,5,6,8,9,10 
3,4,5,6,7,8,9,
10 
D14     8,9,10 4,6,8,9 4,8,10 




D28 5,6,7,8,9 2,3,7,9,10 1,6,7,8,9 1,3,4,6,7,8,10 
1,3,4,6,7,8,9,
10 
Table 20: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 7,8,9,10 4 5,7 4 4 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 3,4 1,6,9   2 
D14 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 1,7,10 1 5 2 
D21 10 9 2,7,8   3 
D28 3 7     6 
Table 21: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
The following six tables relate to portfolios constructed as quantiles of 500 shares, where the investor 
implemented the reversal strategy immediately. 
 
Table 22 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the entire sample 







Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 












D7   7,9 10 2,3,5,7,8 2,6,8,9,10 
D14 10   4,10 2,5,7,8,9,10 5,6,8,9 
D21 2,5,6,7,10 1,2,4,6,8,9 2,3,7,8 2,4,5,7,9,10 2,5,9 




Table 22: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,7,8 7 1,3,4 10 2,7 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9     
D14 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,3 1,3,6,8,9 1 1 
D21   9       
D28 3,8,10     4,5,10 4 
Table 23: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Table 24 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the pre-crash period. 
Table 25 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the pre-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,5,6,7,8,9 1,2,3,6,8,10 1,3,4,6,10 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9 1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10 
D7   4,6,7,9 10 2,5,6,8,10 2,7,8,9,10 
D14   7,10 10 5,10 2,6,8,9 
D21 2,4,5,6,7,9,10 4,6,8,9 3,5,6,7,10 3,5,6,7,9,10 3,4,5,9 
D28 10 2,3,4,6,7,8 3,4,6,8,10 4,5,7,10 4,8 






Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 6,8 4,7   9 9 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9   1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 7   
D14 1,2,3,4,5,6,8 1,2,9 1 1,3 1,5,6,7 
D21 5 4       
D28 1,2,8 9   3   
Table 25: Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period. 
 
Table 26 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the post-crash period. 
Table 27 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the post-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 












D7   9   2,3,4,5,7,8 2,5,6,8 












Table 26: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,7   3,7 7,9,10 7 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 7,10   
D14 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 1,2,7,8,10 9     
D21   9 2     
D28 10     4,10 2,4,5 
Table 27: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
The following six tables relate to portfolios constructed as quantiles of 100 shares, where the investor 
skipped a day before implementing the reversal strategy. 
 
Table 28 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the entire sample 







Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 





























5,6,9 2,3,5,7,8,9,10 6,7,8,9 1,4,7,8,9,10 1,6,7,8,9 
Table 28: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding Period 
D 6,7 2,3,4,6,9 9   4 
D7     1,6,7,9 6,9 6 
D14 1,3   10 6 2 
D21 3     2,3   
D28 3 7,9   2 6 
Table 29: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Table 30 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the pre-crash period. 
Table 31 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the pre-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 






1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10 1,3,5,6,9 2,3,4,8,9,10 
3,4,5,6,7,8,
10 
D7 3,5,6,9 1,6,7,8 3,5,8,10 3,6,9,10 3,6,9 




D21 1,4,6,8,10   5 4,8,9 4,6 
D28 2,9 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 5,8 9,10 1,7,8 






Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding Period 
D 5,6,10 1,3,5     4,7 
D7     1 6,8 1,6 
D14 1         
D21 3,8   1,3,4 3,10 1 
D28   8   2 3,10 
Table 31: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period. 
 
Table 32 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the post-crash period. 
Table 33 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the post-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 












1,2,3,6,7,9 2,3,4,5 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
,10 










2,3,7,9,10 1,6,7,8,9 1,3,4,6,7,8,10 1,3,6,7,8,9,10 
Table 32: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding Period 
D 2 2,5,6 9   4 
D7     1,6,9 5,9 4,7,9 
D14 3,10   10 6   
D21 3,10     2 9,10 
D28 5       7 
Table 33: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
The following six tables relate to portfolios constructed as quantiles of 500 shares, where the investor 
skipped a day before implementing the reversal strategy. 
 
Table 34 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the entire sample 







Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 





















2,3,4,8,10 2,4,5,6,9,10 2,4,5 
Table 34: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,3 1,8 7 5   
D7 3,5,10 9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 2   
D14 4,8   8,9 2   
D21 5 5,9   1   
D28 8,10 4,6   4   
Table 35: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the entire sample period. 
 
Table 36 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the pre-crash period. 
Table 37 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the pre-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 






D7 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 2,3,4,6,7,9 10 2,5,6,8,10 6,8,10 








3,4,6,8,10 4,5,7 4 






Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,3,6   9 5,9   
D7 5 9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9     
D14 1     5,10 5,6,7,8 
D21   4 1,7   7 
D28 8 2   1,3 5 
Table 37: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the pre-crash period. 
 
Table 38 details the portfolios in each case that had positive average returns, over the post-crash period. 
Table 39 details the portfolios in each case that had significant average returns, over the post-crash 
period. 
 
Portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period 
D 2,3,5,6 2,3,6,7,8 2,3,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9 2,5,6,7,8,9,10 
D7 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10 1,2,4,5,6,7,9   1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9 1,2,3,4,5,6,8 
D14 6,10 1,2,4,5,6,9 2,4,5,7,10 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 1,2,5,7,8,9,10 
D21 1,3,5,6,10 1,2,6,7,9 1,2,7,8,9 2,4,5,7,9,10 1,2,5 
D28 2,6,10 2,4,5,6,9,10 2,4,8,10 2,3,4,5,6,9,10 2,3,4,5,7,9,10 
Table 38: portfolios with positive average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
Portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period 
  Formation Period 
  D D7 D14 D21 D28 
Holding 
Period  
D   1,8 6 10   
D7 8,10   1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 2,3,7 1,2 
D14 4,8,10   9 4,7 5 
D21   9 2   2 
D28 10 6   4 2,4,5 
Table 39: portfolios with significant average returns, in each case, over the post-crash period. 
 
 
